FKIE_CVE-2026-71851
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-07 19:18 - Updated: 2026-10-24 15:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "crypto-js",
"vendor": "brix",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 4.0.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "crypto-js is a JavaScript library of crypto standards. Versions of crypto-js prior to 4.0.0 generate randomness in CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() using a custom variation of the Multiply-With-Carry pseudorandom number generator, seeded from Math.random(), instead of a cryptographically secure source. This generator was introduced in version 3.1.2-4 and remained present in nearly every 3.x release. Nominal requests for 128 or 256 bits of entropy through this function produce effective search spaces of approximately 2 to the 39th and 2 to the 47th possibilities, small enough to enumerate on commodity hardware. Downstream wallet applications that used CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() as the entropy source for BIP39 recovery phrases are affected, and an attacker who enumerates the reduced output space can recover the resulting private keys and control the associated funds. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "crypto-js es una biblioteca JavaScript de est\u00e1ndares criptogr\u00e1ficos. Las versiones de crypto-js anteriores a la 4.0.0 generan aleatoriedad en CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() utilizando una variaci\u00f3n personalizada del generador de n\u00fameros pseudoaleatorios Multiply-With-Carry, sembrado a partir de Math.random(), en lugar de una fuente criptogr\u00e1ficamente segura. Este generador fue introducido en la versi\u00f3n 3.1.2-4 y permaneci\u00f3 presente en casi todas las versiones 3.x. Las solicitudes nominales de 128 o 256 bits de entrop\u00eda a trav\u00e9s de esta funci\u00f3n producen espacios de b\u00fasqueda efectivos de aproximadamente 2 elevado a la 39 y 2 elevado a la 47 posibilidades, lo suficientemente peque\u00f1os como para ser enumerados en hardware comercial. Las aplicaciones de monedero descendentes que utilizaron CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() como fuente de entrop\u00eda para frases de recuperaci\u00f3n BIP39 se ven afectadas, y un atacante que enumere el espacio de salida reducido puede recuperar las claves privadas resultantes y controlar los fondos asociados. Este problema est\u00e1 solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 4.0.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-71851",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T15:10:00.190",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.0,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-71851",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-08T03:05:26.687602Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-07T19:18:54.390",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/commit/b405ff597fb3ac76a7bdfbc72dca10ba1079b1d5"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/security/advisories/GHSA-rg76-677x-56q9"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://www.coinspect.com/blog/ill-bloom-investigation"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/security/advisories/GHSA-rg76-677x-56q9"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-331"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-334"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-338"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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