FKIE_CVE-2026-71294

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-05 13:24 - Updated: 2026-08-05 16:17
Summary
Cotonti CMS's Comments plugin deserializes user-supplied data without restricting the classes that may be instantiated. In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php, a `ci` POST parameter obtained via `cot_import('ci', 'P', 'TXT')` (trim-only sanitization) is passed to `unserialize(base64_decode($ci))` with no `allowed_classes` restriction, reachable by any member with write access to comments (the default `Auth_members => 'RW'` setting in plugins/comments/comments.setup.php). In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php, a `cb` parameter is similarly deserialized via `unserialize(base64_decode($this->comeback))` in prepareComeBack(), reachable by any member editing their own comment. Because unserialize() is called without allowed_classes, an attacker can construct a serialized PHP object of any class loaded by Cotonti (a PHP Object Injection primitive). This was demonstrated in practice using Cotonti's own MySQL_cache class: a crafted serialized MySQL_cache object, once deserialized and later garbage-collected, triggers its __destruct()->flush() chain, causing an attacker-controlled INSERT INTO cot_cache with attacker-chosen row values — confirming genuine POP-chain exploitation, with further impact (including potential RCE) contingent on other gadget chains available in a given Cotonti installation's loaded classes. A third sink in DeleteAction.php contains the identical unserialize() pattern but is gated behind an admin-only authorization check and is not reachable by ordinary members.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Cotonti",
          "programFiles": [
            "plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php",
            "plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php"
          ],
          "vendor": "Cotonti",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Cotonti CMS\u0027s Comments plugin deserializes user-supplied data without restricting the classes that may be instantiated. In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php, a `ci` POST parameter obtained via `cot_import(\u0027ci\u0027, \u0027P\u0027, \u0027TXT\u0027)` (trim-only sanitization) is passed to `unserialize(base64_decode($ci))` with no `allowed_classes` restriction, reachable by any member with write access to comments (the default `Auth_members =\u003e \u0027RW\u0027` setting in plugins/comments/comments.setup.php). In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php, a `cb` parameter is similarly deserialized via `unserialize(base64_decode($this-\u003ecomeback))` in prepareComeBack(), reachable by any member editing their own comment. Because unserialize() is called without allowed_classes, an attacker can construct a serialized PHP object of any class loaded by Cotonti (a PHP Object Injection primitive). This was demonstrated in practice using Cotonti\u0027s own MySQL_cache class: a crafted serialized MySQL_cache object, once deserialized and later garbage-collected, triggers its __destruct()-\u003eflush() chain, causing an attacker-controlled INSERT INTO cot_cache with attacker-chosen row values \u2014 confirming genuine POP-chain exploitation, with further impact (including potential RCE) contingent on other gadget chains available in a given Cotonti installation\u0027s loaded classes. A third sink in DeleteAction.php contains the identical unserialize() pattern but is gated behind an admin-only authorization check and is not reachable by ordinary members."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-71294",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-05T16:17:08.827",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 7.6,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 4.7,
        "source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-71294",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-05T15:35:00.816320Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-05T13:24:54.180",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
      "url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti"
    },
    {
      "source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
      "url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti/blob/master/plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-502"
        }
      ],
      "source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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