FKIE_CVE-2026-71294
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-05 13:24 - Updated: 2026-08-05 16:17
Severity
Summary
Cotonti CMS's Comments plugin deserializes user-supplied data without restricting the classes that may be instantiated. In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php, a `ci` POST parameter obtained via `cot_import('ci', 'P', 'TXT')` (trim-only sanitization) is passed to `unserialize(base64_decode($ci))` with no `allowed_classes` restriction, reachable by any member with write access to comments (the default `Auth_members => 'RW'` setting in plugins/comments/comments.setup.php). In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php, a `cb` parameter is similarly deserialized via `unserialize(base64_decode($this->comeback))` in prepareComeBack(), reachable by any member editing their own comment. Because unserialize() is called without allowed_classes, an attacker can construct a serialized PHP object of any class loaded by Cotonti (a PHP Object Injection primitive). This was demonstrated in practice using Cotonti's own MySQL_cache class: a crafted serialized MySQL_cache object, once deserialized and later garbage-collected, triggers its __destruct()->flush() chain, causing an attacker-controlled INSERT INTO cot_cache with attacker-chosen row values — confirming genuine POP-chain exploitation, with further impact (including potential RCE) contingent on other gadget chains available in a given Cotonti installation's loaded classes. A third sink in DeleteAction.php contains the identical unserialize() pattern but is gated behind an admin-only authorization check and is not reachable by ordinary members.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Cotonti",
"programFiles": [
"plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php",
"plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php"
],
"vendor": "Cotonti",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Cotonti CMS\u0027s Comments plugin deserializes user-supplied data without restricting the classes that may be instantiated. In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php, a `ci` POST parameter obtained via `cot_import(\u0027ci\u0027, \u0027P\u0027, \u0027TXT\u0027)` (trim-only sanitization) is passed to `unserialize(base64_decode($ci))` with no `allowed_classes` restriction, reachable by any member with write access to comments (the default `Auth_members =\u003e \u0027RW\u0027` setting in plugins/comments/comments.setup.php). In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php, a `cb` parameter is similarly deserialized via `unserialize(base64_decode($this-\u003ecomeback))` in prepareComeBack(), reachable by any member editing their own comment. Because unserialize() is called without allowed_classes, an attacker can construct a serialized PHP object of any class loaded by Cotonti (a PHP Object Injection primitive). This was demonstrated in practice using Cotonti\u0027s own MySQL_cache class: a crafted serialized MySQL_cache object, once deserialized and later garbage-collected, triggers its __destruct()-\u003eflush() chain, causing an attacker-controlled INSERT INTO cot_cache with attacker-chosen row values \u2014 confirming genuine POP-chain exploitation, with further impact (including potential RCE) contingent on other gadget chains available in a given Cotonti installation\u0027s loaded classes. A third sink in DeleteAction.php contains the identical unserialize() pattern but is gated behind an admin-only authorization check and is not reachable by ordinary members."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-71294",
"lastModified": "2026-08-05T16:17:08.827",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 7.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 4.7,
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-71294",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-05T15:35:00.816320Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-05T13:24:54.180",
"references": [
{
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti"
},
{
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"url": "https://github.com/Cotonti/Cotonti/blob/master/plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-502"
}
],
"source": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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