FKIE_CVE-2026-70558
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-06 22:18 - Updated: 2026-10-24 15:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Dinky",
"vendor": "DataLinkDC",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.2.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Dinky\u0027s POST /download/uploadFromRsByLocal handler passes the caller-supplied path parameter directly to new File(path) and file.transferTo(dest) with no path validation. The route is marked @SaIgnore and /download/** is excluded from the Sa-Token interceptor, so the only guard is a header equality check against a dinkyToken value whose default (efda1551-7958-4e0f-80a8-dfd107df3e38) is hardcoded in source and shipped to every deployment. Anyone who can reach Dinky\u0027s HTTP port (8888 by default) and supplies the hardcoded token can write arbitrary files as the Dinky service account. The default Docker image runs on 8888 with no proxy or authentication and chmod 777 on /opt/dinky, so the application\u0027s own classpath, launch scripts, and static assets are writable. Demonstrated impact: overwriting /opt/dinky/config/static/index.html served attacker JavaScript to admin browsers immediately, and writing /opt/dinky/org/dinky/Dinky.class executed attacker code as the Dinky service account at the next JVM start via a classpath-shadow launched by script/bin/auto.sh. Writes are uid 9999 (flink), not root, so /etc, /root, /home, and /usr are refused. Affects Dinky v1.2.5 (the current release) and the development branch, where the code is byte-identical."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El gestor POST /download/uploadFromRsByLocal de Dinky pasa el par\u00e1metro de ruta proporcionado por el llamador directamente a new File(path) y file.transferTo(dest) sin validaci\u00f3n de ruta. La ruta est\u00e1 marcada como @SaIgnore y /download/** est\u00e1 excluido del interceptor Sa-Token, por lo que la \u00fanica protecci\u00f3n es una comprobaci\u00f3n de igualdad de encabezado contra un valor dinkyToken cuyo predeterminado (efda1551-7958-4e0f-80a8-dfd107df3e38) est\u00e1 codificado en el c\u00f3digo fuente y se env\u00eda a cada despliegue. Cualquiera que pueda alcanzar el puerto HTTP de Dinky (8888 por defecto) y proporcione el token codificado puede escribir archivos arbitrarios como la cuenta de servicio de Dinky. La imagen Docker predeterminada se ejecuta en 8888 sin proxy ni autenticaci\u00f3n y chmod 777 en /opt/dinky, por lo que el classpath propio de la aplicaci\u00f3n, los scripts de lanzamiento y los activos est\u00e1ticos son escribibles. Impacto demostrado: sobrescribir /opt/dinky/config/static/index.html sirvi\u00f3 JavaScript del atacante a los navegadores de los administradores inmediatamente, y escribir /opt/dinky/org/dinky/Dinky.class ejecut\u00f3 c\u00f3digo del atacante como la cuenta de servicio de Dinky en el siguiente inicio de la JVM a trav\u00e9s de un classpath-shadow lanzado por script/bin/auto.sh. Las escrituras son uid 9999 (flink), no root, por lo que /etc, /root, /home y /usr son rechazados. Afecta a Dinky v1.2.5 (la versi\u00f3n actual) y a la rama de desarrollo, donde el c\u00f3digo es id\u00e9ntico en bytes."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-70558",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T15:10:00.190",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 9.3,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-70558",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-08T02:29:42.857370Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-06T22:18:26.227",
"references": [
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://github.com/DataLinkDC/dinky"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://github.com/DataLinkDC/dinky/issues/4566"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://github.com/DataLinkDC/dinky/security/advisories/GHSA-2p66-w3p3-5226"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-434"
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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