FKIE_CVE-2026-68900
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-19 20:17 - Updated: 2026-10-26 10:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "wekan",
"vendor": "wekan",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 8.72, \u003c 10.23"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Wekan is open source kanban built with Meteor. From 8.72 until 10.23, addBoardHTMLToZip() in client/lib/exportHTML.js read a card title and body through textContent, which decoded entity-encoded markup, and then interpolated titleText and allText into content.innerHTML in the exported index.html. A board member could store an entity-encoded event-handler payload in a card title that remained inert on the live board but was reparsed and executed when a recipient clicked the card in the downloaded HTML export, allowing the script to read and transmit all board data contained in that export, including content added after the attacker\u0027s membership was removed. Version 10.23 builds the modal with DOM nodes and assigns untrusted values through textContent. This issue is fixed in version 10.23."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Wekan es un kanban de c\u00f3digo abierto construido con Meteor. Desde la 8.72 hasta la 10.23, addBoardHTMLToZip() en cliente/lib/exportHTML.js le\u00eda un t\u00edtulo y cuerpo de tarjeta a trav\u00e9s de textContent, que decodificaba el marcado codificado por entidades, y luego interpolaba titleText y allText en content.innerHTML en el index.html exportado. Un miembro del tablero pod\u00eda almacenar una carga \u00fatil de gestor de eventos codificada por entidades en el t\u00edtulo de una tarjeta que permanec\u00eda inerte en el tablero en vivo, pero era reanalizada y ejecutada cuando un destinatario hac\u00eda clic en la tarjeta en la exportaci\u00f3n HTML descargada, permitiendo que el script leyera y transmitiera todos los datos del tablero contenidos en esa exportaci\u00f3n, incluyendo contenido a\u00f1adido despu\u00e9s de que la membres\u00eda del atacante fuera eliminada. La versi\u00f3n 10.23 construye el modal con nodos DOM y asigna valores no confiables a trav\u00e9s de textContent. Este problema est\u00e1 solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 10.23."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-68900",
"lastModified": "2026-10-26T10:10:00.140",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
"impactScore": 4.7,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-68900",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-19T19:43:22.561509Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-19T20:17:21.727",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/wekan/wekan/commit/2d32e34621d340b00be4f66a6a2106ab4575cc70"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/wekan/wekan/releases/tag/v10.23"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/wekan/wekan/security/advisories/GHSA-8r5p-4q9j-f5jx"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/wekan/wekan/security/advisories/GHSA-8r5p-4q9j-f5jx"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-79"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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