FKIE_CVE-2026-68582

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-02 13:16 - Updated: 2026-10-23 22:10
Severity
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Summary
Vikunja versions >= 0.24.0 and <= 2.3.0 contain a broken object level authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in the task-collection endpoint (GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks). The endpoint loads the requested project view from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a link-share token holder, the task scope is pinned to the share's own project, but the view is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated. As a result, a holder of any project share link can read any other tenant's kanban bucket records — bucket titles and the full created_by user object (username, name, id) — for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also creates a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users. Task contents remain constrained to the share's own project and are not disclosed. Fixed in 2.4.0.
References
disclosure@vulncheck.comhttps://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c
disclosure@vulncheck.comhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-broken-object-level-authorization-via-link-share-token
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageURL": "pkg:golang/code.vikunja.io/api",
          "product": "vikunja",
          "vendor": "go-vikunja",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2.4.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.24.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Vikunja versions \u003e= 0.24.0 and \u003c= 2.3.0 contain a broken object level authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in the task-collection endpoint (GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks). The endpoint loads the requested project view from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a link-share token holder, the task scope is pinned to the share\u0027s own project, but the view is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated. As a result, a holder of any project share link can read any other tenant\u0027s kanban bucket records \u2014 bucket titles and the full created_by user object (username, name, id) \u2014 for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also creates a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users. Task contents remain constrained to the share\u0027s own project and are not disclosed. Fixed in 2.4.0."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Las versiones de Vikunja \u003e= 0.24.0 y menor o igual que 2.3.0 contienen una vulnerabilidad de autorizaci\u00f3n a nivel de objeto rota (BOLA) en el endpoint de recolecci\u00f3n de tareas (GET /API/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks). El endpoint carga la vista de proyecto solicitada desde la ruta URL sin verificar que el llamador est\u00e9 autorizado para ello. Para un poseedor de token de enlace compartido, el alcance de la tarea est\u00e1 fijado al propio proyecto del recurso compartido, pero la vista se toma de la ruta controlada por el atacante y nunca se revalida. Como resultado, un poseedor de cualquier enlace de proyecto compartido puede leer los registros de cubos kanban de cualquier otro inquilino - t\u00edtulos de cubo y el objeto de usuario completo created_by (nombre de usuario, nombre, id) - para cada vista en la instancia. La misma carga de vista de pre-autorizaci\u00f3n faltante tambi\u00e9n crea un or\u00e1culo de existencia de ID de proyecto/vista (404 vs. no-404) utilizable por enlaces compartidos y usuarios autenticados ordinarios. Los contenidos de las tareas permanecen restringidos al propio proyecto del recurso compartido y no se divulgan. Corregido en 2.4.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-68582",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-23T22:10:00.160",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 9.3,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-68582",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-03T19:56:15.850224Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-02T13:16:54.233",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c"
    },
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-broken-object-level-authorization-via-link-share-token"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-639"
        }
      ],
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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