FKIE_CVE-2026-68272
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-10 13:20 - Updated: 2026-08-17 05:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3f190956404da55560056ce20606010e18bc059c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ac9287055ff16a092416c76a19006764e4c6a978",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2aa9ea2bd5146d237c8cc16d8737d878b0298a94",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ac9287055ff16a092416c76a19006764e4c6a978",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "315d2e5741a81b0be763e80413a2677e22b7e596",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ac9287055ff16a092416c76a19006764e4c6a978",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "24668ca3ec19434d7a9574bf9112f2b0614c3a4e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ac9287055ff16a092416c76a19006764e4c6a978",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "84c4c36acd5c4b2558b5069f869a165b2c655c84",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ac9287055ff16a092416c76a19006764e4c6a978",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.5"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.5",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.148",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: validate CP_GFX_SHADOW chunk size in CS pass1\n\nAdd a minimum-length check for the AMDGPU_CHUNK_ID_CP_GFX_SHADOW chunk in\namdgpu_cs_pass1(), matching the gate already present for the IB, FENCE and\nBO_HANDLES chunk types.\n\nThe CP_GFX_SHADOW case previously shared a bare break with the dependency\nand syncobj chunk types, which do not dereference a fixed-size struct. When\nuserspace submits this chunk with length_dw == 0, vmemdup_array_user() is\ncalled with size 0 and returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the IS_ERR()\ncheck. amdgpu_cs_p2_shadow() then dereferences chunk-\u003ekdata as a struct\ndrm_amdgpu_cs_chunk_cp_gfx_shadow (reading shadow-\u003eflags), faulting on the\nZERO_SIZE_PTR and causing a NULL-pointer dereference.\n\nThis is reachable by an unprivileged process in the render group. Reject\nundersized chunks with -EINVAL during pass1 so the bad submission is\nrejected before pass2 ever dereferences the data.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 7f61b2eef7415eccdb40850aca0de94211948657)"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-68272",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:18:29.733",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:16.220",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24668ca3ec19434d7a9574bf9112f2b0614c3a4e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2aa9ea2bd5146d237c8cc16d8737d878b0298a94"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/315d2e5741a81b0be763e80413a2677e22b7e596"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f190956404da55560056ce20606010e18bc059c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84c4c36acd5c4b2558b5069f869a165b2c655c84"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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