FKIE_CVE-2026-68187
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-10 13:20 - Updated: 2026-11-06 17:19| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/exec.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a9eb5c4949008034909bc34ecfa0843ecc1d0ab3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "67cf5cdad823afb0530d6d0341fbf4ca07e93a09",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "66e20942890a383eb39b2009a2ceb4c2ebec37ef",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c62bb00caba66e01fb578d5f0302f247dc64930a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "dfc2a00742af4cb7251c1a8fbce4fbae3cc0de4e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2bc6bf70d41055377f390d06f0f3521deb62fd3b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "55fa2c7f2b15583d1a2fe1b5abcc24377359339f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "16cc4f5c1c4b9e45eca7f7deefa5410a292db599",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/exec.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.265",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.216",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.183",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.148",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.101",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.42",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nexec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack()\n\nThe stop value is derived from bprm-\u003ep \u003e\u003e PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable\nis an unsigned long. If bprm-\u003ep drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes\nzero the loop condition index \u003e= stop is always true.\n\nAfter the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and\nbprm-\u003epage[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array.\nThe pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to\nkmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that\nlands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn\u0027t\nterminate either...\n\nGetting there only requires bprm-\u003ep \u003c PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU\nbprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only\nconstraint on how far bprm-\u003ep is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e.\nthat each individual string still fits in what is left.\n\nbprm-\u003ep starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a\nsingle argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves\nit in the first page:\n\n Oops - load access fault [#1]\n CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1\n epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8\n ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae\n s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000\n a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000\n status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005\n [\u003c801a5324\u003e] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8\n [\u003c800d5f6a\u003e] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e\n [\u003c800a2de4\u003e] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316\n [\u003c800a351a\u003e] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138\n [\u003c800a3d44\u003e] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nThis is an arcane bug but we should still fix it.\n\nCount down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop,\nstop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every\nother value of stop.\n\nOnly CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used\nby binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only.\n\nThe loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434\n(\"elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic\") only moved it\nfrom binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used\npart of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged\nfrom 2.6.12-rc2."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-68187",
"lastModified": "2026-11-06T17:19:21.343",
"metrics": {
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-68187",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-06T16:44:04.798177Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:05.870",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16cc4f5c1c4b9e45eca7f7deefa5410a292db599"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2bc6bf70d41055377f390d06f0f3521deb62fd3b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55fa2c7f2b15583d1a2fe1b5abcc24377359339f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66e20942890a383eb39b2009a2ceb4c2ebec37ef"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67cf5cdad823afb0530d6d0341fbf4ca07e93a09"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9eb5c4949008034909bc34ecfa0843ecc1d0ab3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c62bb00caba66e01fb578d5f0302f247dc64930a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfc2a00742af4cb7251c1a8fbce4fbae3cc0de4e"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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