FKIE_CVE-2026-68170
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-10 13:20 - Updated: 2026-08-17 05:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/mptcp/protocol.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "625fc6060864889fe3d370cdeffbbab762af3cb4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ee458a3f314e9c669ddd227bf5ab08354d9e75cc",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bd7aae448f6ee9d82599a4474664de1e6e91a535",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ee458a3f314e9c669ddd227bf5ab08354d9e75cc",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/mptcp/protocol.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: fix stale skb-\u003esk reference on subflow close\n\nThe backlog list is updated by mptcp_data_ready() under\nmptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup of backlog references to a closing\nsubflow, however, was performed in mptcp_close_ssk(), before\n__mptcp_close_ssk() acquires the ssk lock, and while holding neither\nthe ssk lock nor mptcp_data_lock().\n\nBecause that traversal ran without mptcp_data_lock(), concurrent softirq\nRX processing on another CPU (subflow_data_ready() -\u003e mptcp_data_ready()\n-\u003e __mptcp_add_backlog(), under mptcp_data_lock()) could add a backlog\nentry referencing the ssk while the cleanup loop was in progress. Such\nan entry could be missed by the cleanup, or the concurrent list update\ncould corrupt the traversal, leaving skb-\u003esk pointing at the ssk after\nit is freed.\n\nA later mptcp_backlog_purge() then dereferences the stale pointer,\ntriggering a warning in inet_sock_destruct() (ssk-\u003esk_rmem_alloc != 0)\nfollowed by a use-after-free in mptcp_backlog_purge().\n\nFix this by moving the backlog cleanup into __mptcp_close_ssk(), after\nsubflow-\u003eclosing is set to 1 and while the ssk lock is still held,\nserialized under mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup runs only on the push\npath (MPTCP_CF_PUSH), where backlog references accumulate; on other\nteardown paths the caller already handles cleanup.\n\nWith subflow-\u003eclosing set and mptcp_data_lock() held across the purge,\nany concurrent mptcp_data_ready() either completes its enqueue before\nthe purge runs and is caught, or observes closing=1 and bails out. Once\nmptcp_data_unlock() is reached, no new skb referencing the ssk can be\nenqueued, so the cleanup is exhaustive.\n\nRemove the unprotected traversal from mptcp_close_ssk() entirely."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-68170",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T05:18:17.593",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:03.637",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/625fc6060864889fe3d370cdeffbbab762af3cb4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd7aae448f6ee9d82599a4474664de1e6e91a535"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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