FKIE_CVE-2026-66295

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-06 11:17 - Updated: 2026-11-06 11:17
Severity
2.1 (Low) - CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Summary
Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it. Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction. The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.
References
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66295.html
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-f9r9-vrxq-g566
6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbhttps://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66295
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "saxy",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/saxy",
          "product": "saxy",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/saxy.ex",
            "lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
            "lib/saxy/xml.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:processing_instruction/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
          "vendor": "qcam",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.7.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.7.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:qcam:saxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "qcam/saxy",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/qcam/saxy",
          "product": "saxy",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/saxy.ex",
            "lib/saxy/encoder.ex",
            "lib/saxy/xml.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode!/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy\u0027:encode_to_iodata!/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.Encoder\u0027:encode_to_iodata/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Saxy.XML\u0027:processing_instruction/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy",
          "vendor": "qcam",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Saxy\u0027s XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between \u003c? and ?\u003e, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it.\n\nBecause ?\u003e terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching \u003c? keeps the encoder\u0027s own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction.\n\nThe result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG.\n\nThis issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-66295",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-06T11:17:16.517",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 2.1,
          "baseSeverity": "LOW",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-11-06T11:17:16.517",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66295.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-f9r9-vrxq-g566"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66295"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-91"
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.