FKIE_CVE-2026-64599

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-06 08:16 - Updated: 2026-10-24 16:10
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe() When meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already unwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path. meson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls meson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn down twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown re-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker(). Prevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within meson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. The bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1, using the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer forces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to return NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial initialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a slab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer emits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 print_report+0xcb/0x5e0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 kasan_report+0xca/0x100 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto] platform_probe+0x99/0x140 really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310 ? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100 driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320 bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50 __device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220 device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0 bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130 device_add+0xcfd/0x1430 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? insert_resource+0x34/0x50 ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290 platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590 ? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro] meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro] do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450 ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50 ? __create_object+0x59/0x80 ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0 ? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0 ? kfree+0x32c/0x510 ? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0 load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0 ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 ? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40 ? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0 ? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0 ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10 ? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0 init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180 ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 ? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0 ? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610 ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290 ? lock ---truncated---
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b452019a4127f63c1f2147237fc287d1581f606
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d827ade51a24e18d81afb9f32756d339520a14c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6dda8406d8a3da2519c8b388d443d7357839cb63
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6effdbaca3cd8354540bdf42c7f5fb84412afeb7
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84a00be9b736aa5dce902a290f62cbbbdcfab9ed
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2c48aa7a6be36d4c93da75d14d4b4f2f4168c81
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c80360b4e85099fc3835378a96a59c0a2480fb07
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f30e2b879bda14bc3e1524fba6f8ab9ec119da90
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "c2c48aa7a6be36d4c93da75d14d4b4f2f4168c81",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "48fe583fe54177bfb80f348e2a5cc34c3f710095",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c80360b4e85099fc3835378a96a59c0a2480fb07",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "48fe583fe54177bfb80f348e2a5cc34c3f710095",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5b452019a4127f63c1f2147237fc287d1581f606",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "48fe583fe54177bfb80f348e2a5cc34c3f710095",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f30e2b879bda14bc3e1524fba6f8ab9ec119da90",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "48fe583fe54177bfb80f348e2a5cc34c3f710095",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6effdbaca3cd8354540bdf42c7f5fb84412afeb7",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "48fe583fe54177bfb80f348e2a5cc34c3f710095",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "84a00be9b736aa5dce902a290f62cbbbdcfab9ed",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "48fe583fe54177bfb80f348e2a5cc34c3f710095",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6dda8406d8a3da2519c8b388d443d7357839cb63",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "48fe583fe54177bfb80f348e2a5cc34c3f710095",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6d827ade51a24e18d81afb9f32756d339520a14c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "48fe583fe54177bfb80f348e2a5cc34c3f710095",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.5"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.5",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.10.261",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.212",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.178",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.145",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.96",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.39",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe()\n\nWhen meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already\nunwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path.\nmeson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls\nmeson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn\ndown twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown\nre-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN\nreported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker().\n\nPrevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within\nmeson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path.\n\nThe bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are\ndeveloping for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing\nv6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly\navailable.\n\nThe bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1,\nusing the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer\nforces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to\nreturn NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial\ninitialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a\nslab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer\nemits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM.\n\n    ==================================================================\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n    Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265\n\n    CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy)\n    Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE\n    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\n    Call Trace:\n     \u003cTASK\u003e\n     dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0\n     print_report+0xcb/0x5e0\n     ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0\n     ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n     ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n     kasan_report+0xca/0x100\n     ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n     kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n     meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto]\n     platform_probe+0x99/0x140\n     really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0\n     ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10\n     __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310\n     ? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100\n     driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210\n     ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10\n     __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320\n     bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190\n     ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10\n     ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50\n     __device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0\n     ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10\n     ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220\n     device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0\n     bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130\n     device_add+0xcfd/0x1430\n     ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10\n     ? insert_resource+0x34/0x50\n     ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290\n     platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590\n     ? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]\n     meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]\n     do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450\n     ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10\n     ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50\n     ? __create_object+0x59/0x80\n     ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60\n     do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0\n     ? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10\n     ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0\n     ? kfree+0x32c/0x510\n     ? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0\n     load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0\n     ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10\n     ? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40\n     ? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0\n     ? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0\n     ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10\n     ? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0\n     init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180\n     ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10\n     ? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0\n     ? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610\n     ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290\n     ? lock\n---truncated---"
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\ncrypto: amlogic - evitar doble limpieza en meson_crypto_probe()\n\nCuando meson_allocate_chanlist() falla despu\u00e9s de una asignaci\u00f3n parcial, ya deshace el estado de la lista de canales asignada a trav\u00e9s de su ruta de error local. meson_crypto_probe() luego salta a error_flow y llama a meson_free_chanlist() de nuevo, causando que los mismos recursos por flujo sean desmantelados dos veces. En la ruta de fallo reproducida, el segundo desmantelamiento reingres\u00f3 a crypto_engine_exit() en un worker ya destruido y KASAN inform\u00f3 un uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n de slab en kthread_destroy_worker().\n\nEvitar la doble liberaci\u00f3n manejando los fallos de asignaci\u00f3n parcial localmente dentro de meson_allocate_chanlist() y omitiendo la ruta de limpieza externa.\n\nEl error fue se\u00f1alado por primera vez por una herramienta de an\u00e1lisis experimental que estamos desarrollando para errores de gesti\u00f3n de memoria del kernel mientras analiz\u00e1bamos v6.13-rc1. La herramienta a\u00fan est\u00e1 en desarrollo y a\u00fan no est\u00e1 disponible p\u00fablicamente.\n\nEl error fue reproducido en un invitado QEMU x86_64 arrancado con KASAN en v7.1, usando el reproductor bajo tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. El reproductor fuerza la segunda llamada a dma_alloc_attrs() en la ruta de sondeo gxl-crypto a devolver NULL, haciendo que meson_allocate_chanlist() falle despu\u00e9s de una inicializaci\u00f3n parcial. En el kernel sin parchear, esto desencaden\u00f3 de forma fiable un uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n de slab. Con esta correcci\u00f3n aplicada, el mismo reproductor ya no emite ning\u00fan informe KASAN y el sondeo falla limpiamente con -ENOMEM.\n\n    ==================================================================\n    BUG: KASAN: uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n de slab en kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n    Lectura de tama\u00f1o 8 en la direcci\u00f3n ff1100010c057a68 por la tarea insmod/265\n\n    CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy)\n    Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE\n    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\n    Rastro de Llamada:\n     [TAREA]\n     dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0\n     print_report+0xcb/0x5e0\n     ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0\n     ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n     ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n     kasan_report+0xca/0x100\n     ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n     kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0\n     meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto]\n     platform_probe+0x99/0x140\n     really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0\n     ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10\n     __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310\n     ? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100\n     driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210\n     ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10\n     __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320\n     bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190\n     ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10\n     ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50\n     __device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0\n     ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10\n     ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220\n     device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0\n     bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130\n     device_add+0xcfd/0x1430\n     ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10\n     ? insert_resource+0x34/0x50\n     ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290\n     platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590\n     ? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]\n     meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]\n     do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450\n     ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10\n     ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50\n     ? __create_object+0x59/0x80\n     ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60\n     do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0\n     ? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10\n     ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0\n     ? kfree+0x32c/0x510\n     ? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0\n     load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0\n     ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10\n     ? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40\n     ? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0\n     ? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0\n     ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10\n     ? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0\n     init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180\n     ? --TRUNCADO--"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-64599",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T16:10:00.153",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-64599",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T15:43:28.785697Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-06T08:16:35.603",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b452019a4127f63c1f2147237fc287d1581f606"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d827ade51a24e18d81afb9f32756d339520a14c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6dda8406d8a3da2519c8b388d443d7357839cb63"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6effdbaca3cd8354540bdf42c7f5fb84412afeb7"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84a00be9b736aa5dce902a290f62cbbbdcfab9ed"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2c48aa7a6be36d4c93da75d14d4b4f2f4168c81"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c80360b4e85099fc3835378a96a59c0a2480fb07"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f30e2b879bda14bc3e1524fba6f8ab9ec119da90"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-415"
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.