FKIE_CVE-2026-64574

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-05 08:16 - Updated: 2026-10-19 21:17
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: tear down new links on vif update error path When ieee80211_vif_update_links() adds new links it allocates a link container for each and calls ieee80211_link_init() (which registers the per-link debugfs files with file->private_data pointing into the container) and ieee80211_link_setup(). If the subsequent drv_change_vif_links() fails, the error path restores the old pointers and jumps to 'free', which frees the new containers but never removes their debugfs entries or stops the links. The debugfs files survive with file->private_data dangling at the freed container, so a later open()+read() (e.g. link-1/txpower) dereferences freed memory in ieee80211_if_read_link(), a use-after-free. The removal path already dismantles links correctly via ieee80211_tear_down_links(), which removes each link's keys and debugfs entries and calls ieee80211_link_stop(); the add path on the error branch does not. Commit be1ba9ed221f ("wifi: mac80211: avoid weird state in error path") hardened this same error path for the link-removal case (new_links == 0) but left the newly-added links' teardown unaddressed. drv_change_vif_links() can fail at runtime on MLO drivers (internal allocation / queue / firmware command failures). Remove the new links' debugfs entries and stop them before freeing. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011290000 by task exploit/145 Call Trace: ... ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) short_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:373) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a RIP: 0010:ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f7eaeb950adb77f71beb546e5ab30f90b41fe6f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/329589417214d3b7221432e5b266ed2bba7ff674
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/901a73523e093beff123b54b1ceaf3113f18acc9
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952c02b33f56207a160421bcd61e7ac53c9c59ae
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c57d97f381306bbfba174e8f708419e007824e0c
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/mac80211/link.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "329589417214d3b7221432e5b266ed2bba7ff674",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "170cd6a66d9a164180eb4dc72d50afa6ce1ce566",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c57d97f381306bbfba174e8f708419e007824e0c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "170cd6a66d9a164180eb4dc72d50afa6ce1ce566",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0f7eaeb950adb77f71beb546e5ab30f90b41fe6f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "170cd6a66d9a164180eb4dc72d50afa6ce1ce566",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "901a73523e093beff123b54b1ceaf3113f18acc9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "170cd6a66d9a164180eb4dc72d50afa6ce1ce566",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "952c02b33f56207a160421bcd61e7ac53c9c59ae",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "170cd6a66d9a164180eb4dc72d50afa6ce1ce566",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/mac80211/link.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.4"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.4",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.148",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.101",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.42",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: tear down new links on vif update error path\n\nWhen ieee80211_vif_update_links() adds new links it allocates a link\ncontainer for each and calls ieee80211_link_init() (which registers the\nper-link debugfs files with file-\u003eprivate_data pointing into the container)\nand ieee80211_link_setup(). If the subsequent drv_change_vif_links() fails,\nthe error path restores the old pointers and jumps to \u0027free\u0027, which frees\nthe new containers but never removes their debugfs entries or stops the\nlinks. The debugfs files survive with file-\u003eprivate_data dangling at the\nfreed container, so a later open()+read() (e.g. link-1/txpower)\ndereferences freed memory in ieee80211_if_read_link(), a use-after-free.\n\nThe removal path already dismantles links correctly via\nieee80211_tear_down_links(), which removes each link\u0027s keys and debugfs\nentries and calls ieee80211_link_stop(); the add path on the error branch\ndoes not. Commit be1ba9ed221f (\"wifi: mac80211: avoid weird state in error\npath\") hardened this same error path for the link-removal case\n(new_links == 0) but left the newly-added links\u0027 teardown unaddressed.\n\ndrv_change_vif_links() can fail at runtime on MLO drivers (internal\nallocation / queue / firmware command failures).\n\nRemove the new links\u0027 debugfs entries and stop them before freeing.\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127)\n  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011290000 by task exploit/145\n  Call Trace:\n   ...\n   ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127)\n   short_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:373)\n   vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572)\n   ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716)\n   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)\n  ...\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a\n  RIP: 0010:ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127)\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-64574",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T21:17:47.677",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-64574",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T15:43:06.568130Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-05T08:16:37.203",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f7eaeb950adb77f71beb546e5ab30f90b41fe6f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/329589417214d3b7221432e5b266ed2bba7ff674"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/901a73523e093beff123b54b1ceaf3113f18acc9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/952c02b33f56207a160421bcd61e7ac53c9c59ae"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c57d97f381306bbfba174e8f708419e007824e0c"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-416"
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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