FKIE_CVE-2026-64513
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-25 10:17 - Updated: 2026-11-03 18:15| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c",
"arch/x86/kvm/x86.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a7277b66511983b57e345c0fba21f1810fd07c0f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "eb90f3417a0cc4880e979ccc84e41890d410ea5b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ff9c4c6428883182960cfe5c78928f0896d80ebc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "eb90f3417a0cc4880e979ccc84e41890d410ea5b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8c8e8ac22ee17d52f9eb2bc814bca7fab90fb8df",
"status": "affected",
"version": "eb90f3417a0cc4880e979ccc84e41890d410ea5b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bb365a506b1e6fb050c0fceaad354fe395385ef0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "eb90f3417a0cc4880e979ccc84e41890d410ea5b",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c",
"arch/x86/kvm/x86.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.114",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.39",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update\n\nThe TPR_THRESHOLD field in the VMCS is used by VMX to induce VM exits\nwhen the guest\u0027s virtual TPR falls under the specified threshold,\nallowing KVM to inject previously masked interrupts.\n\nKVM handles these VM exits in handle_tpr_below_threshold().\nCommit eb90f3417a0c (\"KVM: vmx: speed up TPR below threshold vmexits\")\noptimized this function by calling apic_update_ppr() instead of raising\nKVM_REQ_EVENT. apic_update_ppr() then raises KVM_REQ_EVENT if there is\na pending, deliverable interrupt.\n\nHowever, if there are no new interrupts pending, apic_update_ppr() does\nnot issue the request. Thus, kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() and\nvmx_update_cr8_intercept() are not called before VM entry, which results\nin a high, stale TPR_THRESHOLD. This is problematic due to the following\nsentence in 28.2.1.1 \"VM-Execution Control Fields\" in the SDM:\n\n The following check is performed if the \u201cuse TPR shadow\u201d VM-execution\n control is 1 and the \u201cvirtualize APIC accesses\u201d and \u201cvirtual-interrupt\n delivery\u201d VM-execution controls are both 0: the value of bits 3:0 of\n the TPR threshold VM-execution control field should not be greater\n than the value of bits 7:4 of VTPR.\n\nThis error condition is typically not observed when KVM runs on a bare\nmetal system because modern processors support APICv, which enables\nvirtual-interrupt delivery, and which KVM uses when possible. This\ncauses the processor to no longer generate TPR-below-threshold exits\nand to no longer check TPR_THRESHOLD on entry. However, when running\non older platforms, or under nested virtualization on a hypervisor that\ndoes not support virtual-interrupt delivery and enforces this check\n(like Hyper-V) this can cause a VM entry failure with hardware error\n0x7, as seen in [1].\n\nCall kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() if apic_update_ppr() does not\nfind a deliverable interrupt (and thus does not raise KVM_REQ_EVENT).\nRemove calls to kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() on paths that end up in\napic_update_ppr(), as they now become redundant. This ensures that any\npath that updates the guest\u0027s PPR also figures out if KVM needs to wait\nfor a TPR change (using TPR_THRESHOLD on VMX or CR8 intercepts on SVM)."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64513",
"lastModified": "2026-11-03T18:15:39.353",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-07-25T10:17:37.510",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c8e8ac22ee17d52f9eb2bc814bca7fab90fb8df"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7277b66511983b57e345c0fba21f1810fd07c0f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb365a506b1e6fb050c0fceaad354fe395385ef0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff9c4c6428883182960cfe5c78928f0896d80ebc"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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