FKIE_CVE-2026-64508

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-25 10:17 - Updated: 2026-11-06 17:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch prediction left behind by the old one. Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an old program that occupied the same space. Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse. Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL. Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated while the flush is active.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fbafd5235ca897b322161659ebe8ba651b00b3b
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e52c240c43a601b681e3a4e58fc5685114d4726
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a6c171c6a1ac6d1509752dac131d941a3de0b37
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ff183ee4d8c452960df58175a094828c0513b2e
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96cce16e26dd02a8678f1e87f88a4b5cdb63b995
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eed774da601268dae674e14d54a15e3624691f52
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/filter.h",
            "kernel/bpf/core.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1fbafd5235ca897b322161659ebe8ba651b00b3b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "57631054fae6dcc9c892ae6310b58bbb6f6e5048",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6e52c240c43a601b681e3a4e58fc5685114d4726",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "57631054fae6dcc9c892ae6310b58bbb6f6e5048",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "eed774da601268dae674e14d54a15e3624691f52",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "57631054fae6dcc9c892ae6310b58bbb6f6e5048",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "8ff183ee4d8c452960df58175a094828c0513b2e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "57631054fae6dcc9c892ae6310b58bbb6f6e5048",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7a6c171c6a1ac6d1509752dac131d941a3de0b37",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "57631054fae6dcc9c892ae6310b58bbb6f6e5048",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "96cce16e26dd02a8678f1e87f88a4b5cdb63b995",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "57631054fae6dcc9c892ae6310b58bbb6f6e5048",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "include/linux/filter.h",
            "kernel/bpf/core.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.18"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.18",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.183",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.145",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.97",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.39",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying\n\nThe BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable\nallocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are\nloaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous\nprogram occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch\nprediction left behind by the old one.\n\nFlush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that\nindirect jumps into a newly written program don\u0027t reuse predictions from an\nold program that occupied the same space.\n\nIntroduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush\nstatic call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse.\nArchitectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush\nfunction. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL.\n\nAllocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe\nbecause cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well\nbelow a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated\nwhile the flush is active."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-64508",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-06T17:18:58.230",
  "metrics": {
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-64508",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-11-06T16:40:46.106500Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-25T10:17:36.920",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fbafd5235ca897b322161659ebe8ba651b00b3b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e52c240c43a601b681e3a4e58fc5685114d4726"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a6c171c6a1ac6d1509752dac131d941a3de0b37"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ff183ee4d8c452960df58175a094828c0513b2e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96cce16e26dd02a8678f1e87f88a4b5cdb63b995"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eed774da601268dae674e14d54a15e3624691f52"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}



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