FKIE_CVE-2026-64458
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-25 10:17 - Updated: 2026-11-06 17:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/damon.h",
"mm/damon/ops-common.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "58321b4e6e4f0f412069ab27ccdd56292757343a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "198f0f4c58b9f481e4e51c8c70a6ab9852bbab7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "74fef68d521150281e36cdaa20e9e1ee3e3aa146",
"status": "affected",
"version": "198f0f4c58b9f481e4e51c8c70a6ab9852bbab7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ef2ae10a4582bc92b7e944181bbd2f87f3d30f3a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "198f0f4c58b9f481e4e51c8c70a6ab9852bbab7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9c8f31eaae6140ecadec0c07320498a944556de2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "198f0f4c58b9f481e4e51c8c70a6ab9852bbab7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "76e415ea88d20f022ed5cfcf78c50e156a267e91",
"status": "affected",
"version": "198f0f4c58b9f481e4e51c8c70a6ab9852bbab7f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "35d4a3cf70a855b50e53189ac2f8463e20a02046",
"status": "affected",
"version": "198f0f4c58b9f481e4e51c8c70a6ab9852bbab7f",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"include/linux/damon.h",
"mm/damon/ops-common.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.178",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.96",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.39",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/damon/ops-common: handle extreme intervals in damon_hot_score()\n\nFix three issues in damon_hot_score() that comes from wrong handling of\nextreme (zero or too high) monitoring intervals user setup.\n\nWhen the user sets sampling interval zero, damon_max_nr_accesses(), which\nis called from damon_hot_score(), causes a divide-by-zero. Needless to\nsay, it is a problem.\n\nWhen the user sets the aggregation interval zero, the function returns\nzero. It is wrong, since the real maximum nr_acceses in the setup should\nbe one. Worse yet, it can cause another divide-by-zero from its caller,\ndamon_hot_score(), since it uses damon_max_nr_accesses() return value as a\ndenominator.\n\nWhen the user sets the aggregation interval very high, damon_hot_score()\ncould return a value out of [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] range. Since the return\nvalue is used as an index to the regions_score_histogram array, which is\nDAMOS_MAX_SCORE+1 size, it causes out of bounds array access.\n\nThe issues can be relatively easily reproduced like below. The sysfs\nwrite permission is required, though.\n\n # ./damo start --damos_action lru_prio --damos_quota_space 100M \\\n --damos_quota_interval 1s\n # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0\n # echo 0 \u003e contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/sample_us\n # echo 0 \u003e contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/aggr_us\n # echo commit \u003e state\n # dmesg\n [...]\n [ 131.329762] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n [...]\n [ 131.336089] RIP: 0010:damon_hot_score+0x27/0xd0\n [...]\n\nFix the divide-by-zero intervals problems by explicitly handling the zero\nintervals in damon_max_nr_accesses(). Fix the out-of-bound array access\nby applying [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] bounds before returning from\ndamon_hot_score().\n\nThe issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64458",
"lastModified": "2026-11-06T17:18:55.090",
"metrics": {
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-64458",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-06T16:38:57.314626Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-25T10:17:30.943",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35d4a3cf70a855b50e53189ac2f8463e20a02046"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58321b4e6e4f0f412069ab27ccdd56292757343a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74fef68d521150281e36cdaa20e9e1ee3e3aa146"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76e415ea88d20f022ed5cfcf78c50e156a267e91"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c8f31eaae6140ecadec0c07320498a944556de2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef2ae10a4582bc92b7e944181bbd2f87f3d30f3a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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