FKIE_CVE-2026-64439
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-25 10:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 13:10| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "ef6feb77e2d91761427c5b773edc9c97e1b706ad",
"status": "affected",
"version": "00244da40f7821b242c4612428d4192230dba27f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2b7bd6dccff14b8b632c5244f1fd506918077221",
"status": "affected",
"version": "00244da40f7821b242c4612428d4192230dba27f",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6c9dddeb582fde005360f4fe02c760d45ca05fb5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "00244da40f7821b242c4612428d4192230dba27f",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.39",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "1DA3E752-10DF-4260-A04E-FB6A07086768",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.39",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.15",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "6228DDD6-4557-4AA3-9F43-AB995D471E42",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.1.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc\n\nkrb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and\nrfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL\ncompletion callback and treat any negative return from\ncrypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to\nkfree_sensitive(buffer). When the encrypt_name resolves to an\nasync AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer\nis freed while the backend\u0027s worker still holds a pointer, and the\nworker dereferences the freed slab on completion.\n\nKASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend\nbound to krb5-\u003eencrypt_name:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7\n\nThe helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async\ninstances out at allocation time instead of plumbing\ncrypto_wait_req() through every call site.\n\nReachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and\nnet/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to\nthe krb5 enctype name."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\ncrypto: krb5 - filtrar implementaciones AEAD as\u00edncronas en la asignaci\u00f3n\n\nkrb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() en rfc3961_simplified.c y rfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() en rfc8009_aes2.c establecen una devoluci\u00f3n de llamada de finalizaci\u00f3n NULL y tratan cualquier retorno negativo de crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() como terminal, pasando a kfree_sensitive(buffer). Cuando el encrypt_name se resuelve en una instancia AEAD as\u00edncrona, la solicitud devuelve -EINPROGRESS, el b\u00fafer es liberado mientras el trabajador del backend a\u00fan mantiene un puntero, y el trabajador desreferencia el slab liberado al finalizar.\n\nInforme KASAN bajo UML+SLUB con un backend AEAD as\u00edncrono sint\u00e9tico vinculado a krb5 -\u003e encrypt_name:\n\nBUG: KASAN: uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n de slab en t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7\n\nLos ayudantes fueron escritos de forma s\u00edncrona, as\u00ed que filtrar las instancias as\u00edncronas en el momento de la asignaci\u00f3n en lugar de pasar crypto_wait_req() a trav\u00e9s de cada sitio de llamada.\n\nAlcanzable a trav\u00e9s de net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c y net/ceph/crypto.c en sistemas con un proveedor AEAD as\u00edncrono vinculado al nombre de tipo de cifrado krb5."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64439",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T13:10:00.147",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-25T10:17:28.447",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b7bd6dccff14b8b632c5244f1fd506918077221"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c9dddeb582fde005360f4fe02c760d45ca05fb5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef6feb77e2d91761427c5b773edc9c97e1b706ad"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-416"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.