FKIE_CVE-2026-64431

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-25 10:17 - Updated: 2026-09-03 18:29
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: avoid calling post_write_mst_fixup() for invalid index_block ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write() calls post_write_mst_fixup() when ntfs_ib_write() returns an error, intending to restore the buffer after a failed write. However, ntfs_ib_write() returns an error immediately if pre_write_mst_fixup() validation fails. The caller, ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write(), interprets any error as a write failure requiring rollback. It does not differentiate between I/O errors and validation failures, and calls post_write_mst_fixup() anyway. Since post_write_mst_fixup() assumes that the index_block contents is correct, it doesn't perform the boundary checks, which results in out-of-bounds memory access. An attacker can craft a malicious NTFS image with: - large index_block.usa_ofs offset, pointing outside the ntfs_record - index_block.usa_count = 0, causing integer underflow - or index_block.usa_count larger than actual number of sectors in the ntfs_record, causing out-of-bounds access KASAN reports describing the memory corruption: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c9018 by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 Write of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c91fe by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== Let's move the post_write_mst_fixup() call to ntfs_ib_write(). The ntfs_ib_write() function calls pre_write_mst_fixup() at the beginning. If the index_block contents is invalid, pre_write_mst_fixup() fails and ntfs_ib_write() returns early without calling post_write_mst_fixup() on bad index_block.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b6eedd7cc2936f9238e852b553a1b326105bde8Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2018628301a6d9f54e34b0cb417f1688c66df1dPatch
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel 7.2
linux linux_kernel 7.2
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ntfs/index.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "e2018628301a6d9f54e34b0cb417f1688c66df1d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0a8ac0c1fa0b99a5b29002bc7f232ed7eafddef0",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5b6eedd7cc2936f9238e852b553a1b326105bde8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0a8ac0c1fa0b99a5b29002bc7f232ed7eafddef0",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ntfs/index.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7D22B17B-4F96-43BE-835F-3A80228838B0",
              "versionEndExcluding": "7.1.4",
              "versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.2:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "5E8B9085-7ADB-4A05-89EF-12949B6A0509",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.2:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "1FC0D50D-9D58-4947-A197-A5A3FF07E7E3",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: avoid calling post_write_mst_fixup() for invalid index_block\n\nntfs_icx_ib_sync_write() calls post_write_mst_fixup() when ntfs_ib_write()\nreturns an error, intending to restore the buffer after a failed write.\n\nHowever, ntfs_ib_write() returns an error immediately if\npre_write_mst_fixup() validation fails. The caller,\nntfs_icx_ib_sync_write(), interprets any error as a write failure\nrequiring rollback. It does not differentiate between I/O errors and\nvalidation failures, and calls post_write_mst_fixup() anyway.\n\nSince post_write_mst_fixup() assumes that the index_block contents is\ncorrect, it doesn\u0027t perform the boundary checks, which results in\nout-of-bounds memory access.\n\nAn attacker can craft a malicious NTFS image with:\n  - large index_block.usa_ofs offset, pointing outside the ntfs_record\n  - index_block.usa_count = 0, causing integer underflow\n  - or index_block.usa_count larger than actual number of sectors in the\n    ntfs_record, causing out-of-bounds access\n\nKASAN reports describing the memory corruption:\n  ==================================================================\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0\n  Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c9018 by task p/9428\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190\n   print_report+0x139/0x4ad\n   ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0\n   ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500\n   ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0\n   kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0\n   ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0\n   post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0\n   ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220\n   ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080\n   __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480\n   ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0\n  ==================================================================\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0\n  Write of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c91fe by task p/9428\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190\n   print_report+0x139/0x4ad\n   ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0\n   ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500\n   ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0\n   kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0\n   ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0\n   post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0\n   ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220\n   ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080\n   __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480\n   ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0\n  ==================================================================\n\nLet\u0027s move the post_write_mst_fixup() call to ntfs_ib_write().\nThe ntfs_ib_write() function calls pre_write_mst_fixup() at the beginning.\nIf the index_block contents is invalid, pre_write_mst_fixup() fails and\nntfs_ib_write() returns early without calling post_write_mst_fixup() on\nbad index_block."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-64431",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-03T18:29:10.100",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-25T10:17:27.327",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b6eedd7cc2936f9238e852b553a1b326105bde8"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2018628301a6d9f54e34b0cb417f1688c66df1d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-787"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}



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