FKIE_CVE-2026-64427
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-25 10:17 - Updated: 2026-11-06 17:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: logitech-dj: Fix maxfield check in DJ short report validation
Commit b6a57912854e ("HID: logitech-dj: Prevent REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT
related user initiated OOB write") added validation for the DJ short
output report, but the error path dereferences rep->field[0] even when
rep->maxfield is zero.
Commit 8b9a097eb2fc ("HID: logitech-dj: fix wrong detection of bad
DJ_SHORT output report") made the check conditional on rep being present,
but a crafted descriptor can still create report ID 0x20 with only padding
output items. hid-core registers the report, ignores the padding field,
and leaves rep->maxfield as zero.
In that case the validation enters the rep->maxfield < 1 branch and then
dereferences rep->field[0]->report_count while printing the error message,
causing a NULL pointer dereference during probe. This is reproducible with
uhid by emulating a Logitech receiver with a padding-only DJ short output
report:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in logi_dj_probe+0xb1/0x754 [hid_logitech_dj]
Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000028 by task kworker/4:1/129
...
Call Trace:
logi_dj_probe+0xb1/0x754 [hid_logitech_dj]
hid_device_probe+0x329/0x3f0 [hid]
really_probe+0x162/0x570
__device_attach+0x137/0x2c0
bus_probe_device+0x38/0xc0
device_add+0xa56/0xce0
hid_add_device+0x19c/0x280 [hid]
uhid_device_add_worker+0x2c/0xb0 [uhid]
Reject the zero-field report before printing the field report_count.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.2 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.2 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f3790a6af9c7f47d454225cab9dc145270e48f62",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7754ade02d0fb1caf20392baf4e02937378fd136",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1215febd644c3e16f77e0f1799d89544dd57a754",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2ed9638cfbf9d49bdef9b0f5ee547236c2c2f500",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6f7f22a8d244c2e586b8eb61c7585784b62aea01",
"status": "affected",
"version": "eeb5ad388595ca2b6624689198a057847f3a3e19",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "95b3f23d632490b5eb285b9fcf7284f2ac8f9872",
"status": "affected",
"version": "968e84f5c0dca4960580d174500e4bbf0c45dc15",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "80c1e18473f63fd7c6a2bc9ad6f3d0a6cc4fb500",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ce2a731c179df8869e1969a1b2b5b9e4e1c25f8b",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2b70bebc709489d29a31ac2935aeffb8d5228395",
"status": "affected",
"version": "bc3bba4656ad280267ea78cf845ab6b1d95b9fcd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7a89ad762fad53d56b7002d7ffc923a4b7f4006f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b6a57912854e7ea36f3b270032661140cc4209cd",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "590cc4d782487632a52f37c2171bee1eeea29627",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b6a57912854e7ea36f3b270032661140cc4209cd",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "7D22B17B-4F96-43BE-835F-3A80228838B0",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.1.4",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.2:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "5E8B9085-7ADB-4A05-89EF-12949B6A0509",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.2:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "1FC0D50D-9D58-4947-A197-A5A3FF07E7E3",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: logitech-dj: Fix maxfield check in DJ short report validation\n\nCommit b6a57912854e (\"HID: logitech-dj: Prevent REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT\nrelated user initiated OOB write\") added validation for the DJ short\noutput report, but the error path dereferences rep-\u003efield[0] even when\nrep-\u003emaxfield is zero.\n\nCommit 8b9a097eb2fc (\"HID: logitech-dj: fix wrong detection of bad\nDJ_SHORT output report\") made the check conditional on rep being present,\nbut a crafted descriptor can still create report ID 0x20 with only padding\noutput items. hid-core registers the report, ignores the padding field,\nand leaves rep-\u003emaxfield as zero.\n\nIn that case the validation enters the rep-\u003emaxfield \u003c 1 branch and then\ndereferences rep-\u003efield[0]-\u003ereport_count while printing the error message,\ncausing a NULL pointer dereference during probe. This is reproducible with\nuhid by emulating a Logitech receiver with a padding-only DJ short output\nreport:\n\n BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in logi_dj_probe+0xb1/0x754 [hid_logitech_dj]\n Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000028 by task kworker/4:1/129\n ...\n Call Trace:\n logi_dj_probe+0xb1/0x754 [hid_logitech_dj]\n hid_device_probe+0x329/0x3f0 [hid]\n really_probe+0x162/0x570\n __device_attach+0x137/0x2c0\n bus_probe_device+0x38/0xc0\n device_add+0xa56/0xce0\n hid_add_device+0x19c/0x280 [hid]\n uhid_device_add_worker+0x2c/0xb0 [uhid]\n\nReject the zero-field report before printing the field report_count."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64427",
"lastModified": "2026-11-06T17:18:54.190",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-64427",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-06T16:38:26.994662Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-25T10:17:26.843",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1215febd644c3e16f77e0f1799d89544dd57a754"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b70bebc709489d29a31ac2935aeffb8d5228395"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/590cc4d782487632a52f37c2171bee1eeea29627"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f7f22a8d244c2e586b8eb61c7585784b62aea01"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a89ad762fad53d56b7002d7ffc923a4b7f4006f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80c1e18473f63fd7c6a2bc9ad6f3d0a6cc4fb500"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95b3f23d632490b5eb285b9fcf7284f2ac8f9872"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3790a6af9c7f47d454225cab9dc145270e48f62"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-476"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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