FKIE_CVE-2026-64352
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-25 10:17 - Updated: 2026-11-06 17:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Allow LPM map access from sleepable BPF programs
trie_lookup_elem() annotates its rcu_dereference_check() walks with
only rcu_read_lock_bh_held(). Because rcu_dereference_check(p, c)
resolves to "c || rcu_read_lock_held()", this passes for XDP/NAPI and
classic RCU readers but fails for sleepable BPF programs, which enter
via __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable() and hold only rcu_read_lock_trace().
trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem() have the same problem in a
different form: they walk the trie with plain rcu_dereference(), which
asserts rcu_read_lock_held() unconditionally. Both are reachable from
sleepable BPF programs via the bpf_map_update_elem / bpf_map_delete_elem
helpers, and from the syscall path under classic rcu_read_lock(). In
the writer paths the trie is actually protected by trie->lock (an
rqspinlock taken across the walk); we never relied on the RCU read-side
lock to keep nodes alive there.
A sleepable LSM hook that ends up touching an LPM trie therefore
triggers lockdep on debug kernels:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
7.1.0-... Tainted: G E
-----------------------------
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:249 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
1 lock held by net_tests/540:
#0: (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0},
at: __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x26/0x280
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl
lockdep_rcu_suspicious
trie_lookup_elem
bpf_prog_..._enforce_security_socket_connect
bpf_trampoline_...
security_socket_connect
__sys_connect
do_syscall_64
This is lockdep-only -- no UAF, since Tasks Trace RCU does serialize
against the trie's reclaim path -- but it spams the console once per
distinct callsite on every debug kernel running a sleepable BPF LSM
that touches an LPM trie, which is increasingly common.
For the lookup path, switch the rcu_dereference_check() annotation
from rcu_read_lock_bh_held() to bpf_rcu_lock_held(), which accepts all
three contexts (classic, BH, Tasks Trace). Other map types already
follow this convention.
For trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem(), annotate the walks as
rcu_dereference_protected(*p, 1) -- matching trie_free() in the same
file -- since trie->lock is held across the walk. rqspinlock has no
lockdep_map, so the predicate degenerates to '1' rather than
lockdep_is_held(&trie->lock); the protection is real but not
machine-verifiable. trie_get_next_key() also uses bare
rcu_dereference() but is reachable only from the BPF syscall, which
holds classic rcu_read_lock() before dispatching, so it is left
untouched.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f0967d4f1ba4323a3cb7dc8fdba74dd3a8caaf04",
"status": "affected",
"version": "694cea395fded425008e93cd90cfdf7a451674af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "304ca50582f0c047370f85e13caec456f78c9fcc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "694cea395fded425008e93cd90cfdf7a451674af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ec662a8b2cde01e76b37ccd4b992d0342299e69c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "694cea395fded425008e93cd90cfdf7a451674af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9bfdf4b81b0e56d47bc6c46c34a46638be716695",
"status": "affected",
"version": "694cea395fded425008e93cd90cfdf7a451674af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "57454944737f3ad9a8703aecbbb79713b513a94b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "694cea395fded425008e93cd90cfdf7a451674af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bd6ad9a6b30498d845413e863fb95c6fab3babe3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "694cea395fded425008e93cd90cfdf7a451674af",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2f884d371fafea137afea504d49ee4a7c8d7985b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "694cea395fded425008e93cd90cfdf7a451674af",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.14"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.14",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.212",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.178",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.97",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
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"matchCriteriaId": "28B1EBCD-0599-440A-A1FD-38B50BB22564",
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"vulnerable": true
},
{
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"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
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],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Allow LPM map access from sleepable BPF programs\n\ntrie_lookup_elem() annotates its rcu_dereference_check() walks with\nonly rcu_read_lock_bh_held(). Because rcu_dereference_check(p, c)\nresolves to \"c || rcu_read_lock_held()\", this passes for XDP/NAPI and\nclassic RCU readers but fails for sleepable BPF programs, which enter\nvia __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable() and hold only rcu_read_lock_trace().\n\ntrie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem() have the same problem in a\ndifferent form: they walk the trie with plain rcu_dereference(), which\nasserts rcu_read_lock_held() unconditionally. Both are reachable from\nsleepable BPF programs via the bpf_map_update_elem / bpf_map_delete_elem\nhelpers, and from the syscall path under classic rcu_read_lock(). In\nthe writer paths the trie is actually protected by trie-\u003elock (an\nrqspinlock taken across the walk); we never relied on the RCU read-side\nlock to keep nodes alive there.\n\nA sleepable LSM hook that ends up touching an LPM trie therefore\ntriggers lockdep on debug kernels:\n\n =============================\n WARNING: suspicious RCU usage\n 7.1.0-... Tainted: G E\n -----------------------------\n kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:249 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!\n 1 lock held by net_tests/540:\n #0: (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0},\n at: __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x26/0x280\n Call Trace:\n dump_stack_lvl\n lockdep_rcu_suspicious\n trie_lookup_elem\n bpf_prog_..._enforce_security_socket_connect\n bpf_trampoline_...\n security_socket_connect\n __sys_connect\n do_syscall_64\n\nThis is lockdep-only -- no UAF, since Tasks Trace RCU does serialize\nagainst the trie\u0027s reclaim path -- but it spams the console once per\ndistinct callsite on every debug kernel running a sleepable BPF LSM\nthat touches an LPM trie, which is increasingly common.\n\nFor the lookup path, switch the rcu_dereference_check() annotation\nfrom rcu_read_lock_bh_held() to bpf_rcu_lock_held(), which accepts all\nthree contexts (classic, BH, Tasks Trace). Other map types already\nfollow this convention.\n\nFor trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem(), annotate the walks as\nrcu_dereference_protected(*p, 1) -- matching trie_free() in the same\nfile -- since trie-\u003elock is held across the walk. rqspinlock has no\nlockdep_map, so the predicate degenerates to \u00271\u0027 rather than\nlockdep_is_held(\u0026trie-\u003elock); the protection is real but not\nmachine-verifiable. trie_get_next_key() also uses bare\nrcu_dereference() but is reachable only from the BPF syscall, which\nholds classic rcu_read_lock() before dispatching, so it is left\nuntouched."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64352",
"lastModified": "2026-11-06T17:18:51.143",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-64352",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-06T16:36:44.456089Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-25T10:17:17.547",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f884d371fafea137afea504d49ee4a7c8d7985b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/304ca50582f0c047370f85e13caec456f78c9fcc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57454944737f3ad9a8703aecbbb79713b513a94b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bfdf4b81b0e56d47bc6c46c34a46638be716695"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec662a8b2cde01e76b37ccd4b992d0342299e69c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0967d4f1ba4323a3cb7dc8fdba74dd3a8caaf04"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-416"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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