FKIE_CVE-2026-6406

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-22 19:17 - Updated: 2026-07-23 16:10
Severity
8.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials. A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.
References
security@docker.comhttps://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4590Release Notes
security@docker.comhttps://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-299/Third Party Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
docker docker_desktop *
apple macos -
linux linux_kernel -
microsoft windows -
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "platforms": [
            "MacOS",
            "Linux",
            "Windows"
          ],
          "product": "Docker Desktop",
          "vendor": "Docker",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.59.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.41.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@docker.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:docker:docker_desktop:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "D1189874-3682-44BE-9779-36992F4D8BC8",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.59.0",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.41.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        },
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:apple:macos:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "387021A0-AF36-463C-A605-32EA7DAC172E",
              "vulnerable": false
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "703AF700-7A70-47E2-BC3A-7FD03B3CA9C1",
              "vulnerable": false
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "A2572D17-1DE6-457B-99CC-64AFD54487EA",
              "vulnerable": false
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ],
      "operator": "AND"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials.\n\nA local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "La bandera \u0027--use-api-socket\u0027 de Docker CLI elude las restricciones de Aislamiento Mejorado de Contenedores (ECI) en Docker Desktop. Cuando ECI est\u00e1 habilitado, los montajes de sockets de Docker desde los contenedores son denegados a menos que se permitan expl\u00edcitamente a trav\u00e9s de la configuraci\u00f3n de  admin-settings . Sin embargo, la bandera \u0027--use-api-socket\u0027 a\u00f1ade el montaje del socket de Docker a trav\u00e9s del campo \u0027HostConfig.Mounts\u0027 en lugar del campo \u0027HostConfig.Binds\u0027. La aplicaci\u00f3n de ECI en el proxy de la API de Docker Desktop solo inspeccionaba  Binds , permitiendo que el montaje pasara sin ser verificado. Esto otorga a un contenedor acceso completo al socket del Docker Engine y, si el usuario del host ha iniciado sesi\u00f3n en registros de contenedores, sus credenciales de autenticaci\u00f3n.\n\nUn atacante local con la capacidad de ejecutar comandos de Docker CLI puede explotar esto para evadir las restricciones de ECI, acceder al Docker Engine y potencialmente escalar privilegios."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-6406",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-23T16:10:00.137",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.0,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security@docker.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security@docker.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-6406",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-05-22T00:00:00+00:00",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-22T19:17:04.827",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@docker.com",
      "tags": [
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4590"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@docker.com",
      "tags": [
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-299/"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@docker.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-863"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@docker.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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