FKIE_CVE-2026-64044
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-19 16:17 - Updated: 2026-09-02 21:11
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: respect peer refcount in CMD_NEW_PEER error path
ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit()'s error path calls ovpn_peer_release() directly
rather than ovpn_peer_put(), bypassing the kref. The accompanying
comment ("peer was not yet hashed, thus it is not used in any context")
holds for UDP but not for TCP.
For UDP, the ovpn_socket union uses the .ovpn arm and never points back
at a peer; UDP encap_recv looks up peers via the not-yet-populated
hashtables, so the new peer is unreachable until ovpn_peer_add()
publishes it.
For TCP, ovpn_socket_new() sets ovpn_sock->peer and
ovpn_tcp_socket_attach() publishes ovpn_sock via rcu_assign_sk_user_data().
From that moment until ovpn_socket_release() detaches in the error path,
the TCP fd is fully wired: userspace recvmsg / sendmsg / close / poll
on the fd, as well as the strparser-driven ovpn_tcp_rcv() path, can
reach the peer through sk_user_data -> ovpn_sock->peer and bump its
refcount via ovpn_peer_hold().
ovpn_tcp_socket_wait_finish() (called inside ovpn_socket_release())
drains strparser and the tx work, but does not synchronize with
userspace syscall callers that already hold a peer reference. If
ovpn_nl_peer_modify() or ovpn_peer_add() returns an error while such
a caller is in flight - notably an ovpn_tcp_recvmsg() blocked in
__skb_recv_datagram() on peer->tcp.user_queue - the direct
ovpn_peer_release() destroys the peer while the caller still holds
the reference, and the eventual ovpn_peer_put() from that caller
operates on freed memory.
Replace the direct destructor call with ovpn_peer_put() so the kref
correctly defers destruction until the last reference is dropped.
In the common case where no concurrent user is present, behaviour is
unchanged: the kref hits zero immediately and ovpn_peer_release_kref()
runs the same destructor.
With this conversion ovpn_peer_release() has no callers outside peer.c
- ovpn_peer_release_kref() in the same translation unit is the only
remaining user - so make it static and drop its declaration from
peer.h.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.1 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.1 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.1 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.1 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c",
"drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c",
"drivers/net/ovpn/peer.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "8298834912d76dbc82c12b6b4ab7590ed2bb8ae5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11851cbd60ea1e5abbd97619d69845ead99303d6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0c3ef71879c0264de6c42463031d9e057da87840",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11851cbd60ea1e5abbd97619d69845ead99303d6",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1fef6614673ff0846d30acdeeaf3cf98bb5f6116",
"status": "affected",
"version": "11851cbd60ea1e5abbd97619d69845ead99303d6",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c",
"drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c",
"drivers/net/ovpn/peer.h"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.34",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "2437F48D-051C-4E78-83C2-F198D0F2AE92",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.34",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "0520D091-FC52-4A50-AF07-70AE7D08B750",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.0.11",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.1:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "B1EF7059-E670-45F4-B422-54C40FA86390",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.1:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "0D38F0BF-A728-4133-A358-D44A2F7EE6D6",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.1:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EC732D08-5F7B-46D9-B154-E60C7F4F0A97",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.1:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "E5910A9D-F60A-409A-B486-FE66BFEBA9B9",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novpn: respect peer refcount in CMD_NEW_PEER error path\n\novpn_nl_peer_new_doit()\u0027s error path calls ovpn_peer_release() directly\nrather than ovpn_peer_put(), bypassing the kref. The accompanying\ncomment (\"peer was not yet hashed, thus it is not used in any context\")\nholds for UDP but not for TCP.\n\nFor UDP, the ovpn_socket union uses the .ovpn arm and never points back\nat a peer; UDP encap_recv looks up peers via the not-yet-populated\nhashtables, so the new peer is unreachable until ovpn_peer_add()\npublishes it.\n\nFor TCP, ovpn_socket_new() sets ovpn_sock-\u003epeer and\novpn_tcp_socket_attach() publishes ovpn_sock via rcu_assign_sk_user_data().\nFrom that moment until ovpn_socket_release() detaches in the error path,\nthe TCP fd is fully wired: userspace recvmsg / sendmsg / close / poll\non the fd, as well as the strparser-driven ovpn_tcp_rcv() path, can\nreach the peer through sk_user_data -\u003e ovpn_sock-\u003epeer and bump its\nrefcount via ovpn_peer_hold().\n\novpn_tcp_socket_wait_finish() (called inside ovpn_socket_release())\ndrains strparser and the tx work, but does not synchronize with\nuserspace syscall callers that already hold a peer reference. If\novpn_nl_peer_modify() or ovpn_peer_add() returns an error while such\na caller is in flight - notably an ovpn_tcp_recvmsg() blocked in\n__skb_recv_datagram() on peer-\u003etcp.user_queue - the direct\novpn_peer_release() destroys the peer while the caller still holds\nthe reference, and the eventual ovpn_peer_put() from that caller\noperates on freed memory.\n\nReplace the direct destructor call with ovpn_peer_put() so the kref\ncorrectly defers destruction until the last reference is dropped.\nIn the common case where no concurrent user is present, behaviour is\nunchanged: the kref hits zero immediately and ovpn_peer_release_kref()\nruns the same destructor.\n\nWith this conversion ovpn_peer_release() has no callers outside peer.c\n- ovpn_peer_release_kref() in the same translation unit is the only\nremaining user - so make it static and drop its declaration from\npeer.h."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-64044",
"lastModified": "2026-09-02T21:11:32.317",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-19T16:17:44.690",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c3ef71879c0264de6c42463031d9e057da87840"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fef6614673ff0846d30acdeeaf3cf98bb5f6116"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8298834912d76dbc82c12b6b4ab7590ed2bb8ae5"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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