FKIE_CVE-2026-63962
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-19 16:17 - Updated: 2026-07-20 07:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()
svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once
before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every
point in the loop.
In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of
at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX
modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the
CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming
ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set,
an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken
or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to
ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra
Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes,
the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For
mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the
partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen
SVID/VDO bytes.
Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed
past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner
supplies or how the function was reached.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "845598b154b9a92e9d279fafafa9405c121ae805",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4ab8c18d4d67321cc7b660559de17511d4fc0237",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4505f33dab56c274e82f47f94bf60a8cbf8f4b42",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4ab8c18d4d67321cc7b660559de17511d4fc0237",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cbad85b446c06adbc5e5bed565871bb918ce9d32",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4ab8c18d4d67321cc7b660559de17511d4fc0237",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3389c149c68c3fea61910ad5d34f7bf3bff44e32",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4ab8c18d4d67321cc7b660559de17511d4fc0237",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.93",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.35",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.12",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()\n\nsvdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata-\u003ealtmodes against the array size once\nbefore the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every\npoint in the loop.\n\nIn the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of\nat most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX\nmodes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the\nCMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming\nACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port-\u003epartner is set,\nan unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken\nor malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to\nALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra\nDiscover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes,\nthe loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For\nmode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the\npartner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen\nSVID/VDO bytes.\n\nMove the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed\npast ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner\nsupplies or how the function was reached."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-63962",
"lastModified": "2026-07-20T07:16:41.413",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-07-19T16:17:15.163",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3389c149c68c3fea61910ad5d34f7bf3bff44e32"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4505f33dab56c274e82f47f94bf60a8cbf8f4b42"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/845598b154b9a92e9d279fafafa9405c121ae805"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbad85b446c06adbc5e5bed565871bb918ce9d32"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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