FKIE_CVE-2026-63950

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-19 16:17 - Updated: 2026-07-20 15:16
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one Initialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like folio_referenced_one() does. Without this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call can be reused on a later iteration that does not run folio_unmap_pte_batch() again. mmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call madvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE. Trigger node reclaim through sysfs. Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will first clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio. This will set nr_pages to 15. In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets reused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio refcount/mapcount. At the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit out a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there are existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap (which too I am investigating). I did a one liner kernel change to avoid going into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at folio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted. Note that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree folio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios. Userspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to refcount/mapcount corruption.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/rmap.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0fcc34d0d8fefca4fea349e45c10e3a3d90350eb",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "354dffd29575cdf13154e8fb787322354aa9efc4",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f611db9b771b2b6775357555d2517af044fca4f0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "354dffd29575cdf13154e8fb787322354aa9efc4",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3f8968e9cbf95d5d87d32218906cab0b9b9eddbe",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "354dffd29575cdf13154e8fb787322354aa9efc4",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "mm/rmap.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.35",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.0.12",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/rmap: initialize nr_pages to 1 at loop start in try_to_unmap_one\n\nInitialize nr_pages to 1 at the start of each loop iteration, like\nfolio_referenced_one() does.\n\nWithout this, nr_pages computed by a previous folio_unmap_pte_batch() call\ncan be reused on a later iteration that does not run\nfolio_unmap_pte_batch() again.\n\nmmap a 64K large folio with MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, then call\nmadvise(MADV_FREE), then make the last page device-exclusive via\nHMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE.\n\nTrigger node reclaim through sysfs.  Now, in try_to_unmap_one(), we will\nfirst clear the first 15 out of 16 entries mapping the lazyfree folio. \nThis will set nr_pages to 15.  In the next pvmw walk, this nr_pages gets\nreused on a device-exclusive pte, thus potentially corrupting folio\nrefcount/mapcount.\n\nAt the moment, I have a userspace program which can make the kernel spit\nout a trace, but the blow up is in folio_referenced_one(), because there\nare existing bugs in the interaction between device-private and rmap\n(which too I am investigating).  I did a one liner kernel change to avoid\ngoing into folio_referenced_one(), and the kernel blows up at\nfolio_remove_rmap_ptes in try_to_unmap_one which is what I wanted.\n\nNote that the bug is there not since file folio batching but lazyfree\nfolio batching, since device-exclusive only works for anonymous folios.\n\nUserspace visible effect is simply kernel crashing somewhere due to\nrefcount/mapcount corruption."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-63950",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-20T15:16:58.600",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-19T16:17:13.730",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fcc34d0d8fefca4fea349e45c10e3a3d90350eb"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f8968e9cbf95d5d87d32218906cab0b9b9eddbe"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f611db9b771b2b6775357555d2517af044fca4f0"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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