FKIE_CVE-2026-63895
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-19 16:17 - Updated: 2026-07-19 16:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read
ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.
Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:
* dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT
(short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
* aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket.
* renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the
request.
* dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.
A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before
copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe
pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer.
The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in
real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon
(adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not
reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks
normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach
the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that
bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a
1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of
non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer.
Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to
userspace.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "90ccf5fb63243fae1b4b3200f3310500500ecf2e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "af32dbb2ca0b3d09271ab718d13857a457fa16f2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e835bf9a055f71874065a40780ca5560b7df8b33",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "88874a19b2b093bfaaa1c0090fa536c44da8c08b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "607730a414773a7cbe3037a64a6c64e72689ff5e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "23c1f7deb9dd8447ecde749850676302aa1e2bd3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4e036c10e7f4df5d951c69cc3697bc8e209c6d02",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ddf8abd2599491cbad959c700b90ba72a5dce8d0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.35"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.35",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.210",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.176",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.143",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.93",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.35",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.12",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read\n\nffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with\nkmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup\npacket, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of\nhow many bytes were actually received:\n\n data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);\n ...\n ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);\n if ((ret \u003e 0) \u0026\u0026 (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))\n ret = -EFAULT;\n\n__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req-\u003eactual, which on a short\ncontrol OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The\ncopy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT\nthe last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --\nuninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS\ndaemon.\n\nShort ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer\nbehavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:\n\n * dwc2 continues on req-\u003eactual \u003c req-\u003elength for ep0 DATA OUT\n (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).\n * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len \u003c ep-\u003eep.maxpacket.\n * renesas_usbf logs \"ep0 short packet\" and completes the\n request.\n * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.\n\nA short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is\na normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs\nimplementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does\nthis correctly via min(len, dev-\u003ereq-\u003eactual) before\ncopy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe\npattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer.\n\nThe bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in\nreal deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon\n(adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not\nreachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks\nnormally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach\nthe gadget, so reproducing this required a build that\nbypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a\n1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of\nnon-canary slab residue in the daemon\u0027s read buffer.\n\nFix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to\nuserspace."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-63895",
"lastModified": "2026-07-19T16:17:06.990",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-07-19T16:17:06.990",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23c1f7deb9dd8447ecde749850676302aa1e2bd3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e036c10e7f4df5d951c69cc3697bc8e209c6d02"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/607730a414773a7cbe3037a64a6c64e72689ff5e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88874a19b2b093bfaaa1c0090fa536c44da8c08b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90ccf5fb63243fae1b4b3200f3310500500ecf2e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af32dbb2ca0b3d09271ab718d13857a457fa16f2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e835bf9a055f71874065a40780ca5560b7df8b33"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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