FKIE_CVE-2026-63888
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-19 16:17 - Updated: 2026-07-20 15:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()
Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the
original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add
iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"):
1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).
text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then
incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest
in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the
buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
...
rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;
}
...
if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);
iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so
when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the
text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched
mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text
PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against
the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to
the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text
PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.
Fix by passing the actual padded payload length
(ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc().
2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest
drop.
On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler
silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap:
kfree(text_in);
return 0;
cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text
Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which
unconditionally does
kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr);
cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL;
freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via
iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free
if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives.
On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on
the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so
#4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this
patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three
relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of
this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after
login produces two back-to-back splats:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x??
BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x??
showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in
iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once
more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels
with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free
becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts
the slab freelist.
Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop
path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock
tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4
less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together.
Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and
the wire protocol is unaffected.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f7948af0dd03de84079dcd4dc215a69fd6fbb95d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "badf178b76b0690851df00f4ca9cf2eb8eb0f963",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6e22a1cdcc8277af4acc43710577157b77a02c5d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d3e9b79aa794f7a23e82de4d710e7d2df610e349",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ec9f19d52074a191ed1756ed4a7d39fff1a2085c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "89c81d1228c00fa6dd91de6c1c5aa1ef8a7875e3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5118ea225fe63b44207ba88047e4866e1ea43812",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "778c2ab142c625a8a8afa570e0f9b7873f445d99",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.259",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.210",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.176",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.143",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.93",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.35",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.12",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()\n\nTwo latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the\noriginal LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c (\"iscsi-target: Add\niSCSI fabric support for target v4.1\"):\n\n1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).\n\n text_in is kzalloc()\u0027d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then\n incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest\n in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the\n buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():\n\n if (conn-\u003econn_ops-\u003eDataDigest) {\n ...\n rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;\n }\n ...\n if (conn-\u003econn_ops-\u003eDataDigest) {\n data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);\n\n iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so\n when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the\n text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched\n mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text\n PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against\n the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to\n the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text\n PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.\n\n Fix by passing the actual padded payload length\n (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc().\n\n2) Stale cmd-\u003etext_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL\u003e0 bad DataDigest\n drop.\n\n On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel \u003e 0 the handler\n silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap:\n\n kfree(text_in);\n return 0;\n\n cmd-\u003etext_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text\n Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which\n unconditionally does\n\n kfree(cmd-\u003etext_in_ptr);\n cmd-\u003etext_in_ptr = NULL;\n\n freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via\n iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free\n if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives.\n\n On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on\n the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so\n #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this\n patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three\n relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of\n this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after\n login produces two back-to-back splats:\n\n BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x??\n BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x??\n\n showing the same pointer freed in the ERL\u003e0 drop path and again in\n iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once\n more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels\n with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free\n becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts\n the slab freelist.\n\n Fix by clearing cmd-\u003etext_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL\u003e0 drop\n path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock\n tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4\n less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together.\n\nBoth fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and\nthe wire protocol is unaffected."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-63888",
"lastModified": "2026-07-20T15:16:54.243",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-19T16:17:05.997",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5118ea225fe63b44207ba88047e4866e1ea43812"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e22a1cdcc8277af4acc43710577157b77a02c5d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/778c2ab142c625a8a8afa570e0f9b7873f445d99"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89c81d1228c00fa6dd91de6c1c5aa1ef8a7875e3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/badf178b76b0690851df00f4ca9cf2eb8eb0f963"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3e9b79aa794f7a23e82de4d710e7d2df610e349"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec9f19d52074a191ed1756ed4a7d39fff1a2085c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7948af0dd03de84079dcd4dc215a69fd6fbb95d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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