FKIE_CVE-2026-63811

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-19 12:16 - Updated: 2026-07-19 12:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the previously written data back from the COW inode: prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode: f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode, ...); and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption (STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(). However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode (folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->host. fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates on folio->mapping->host. The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits its encryption policy from there. With test_dummy_encryption the newly created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g. already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted. The read path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted original inode) has a NULL ->i_crypt_info, dereferencing it: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] RIP: 0010:fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks+0xa0/0x310 Workqueue: f2fs_post_read_wq f2fs_post_read_work Call Trace: fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x1eb/0x340 f2fs_post_read_work+0xba/0x140 process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a40 worker_thread+0x677/0xe90 kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0 The COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block address is already resolved into @blkaddr by prepare_atomic_write_begin() via __find_data_block(cow_inode, ...); f2fs_submit_page_read() then reads from that physical @blkaddr directly, so the inode argument only selects the post-read crypto context, not which block is fetched. Reading with @inode therefore returns the same (latest, not-yet-committed) COW data, while making both the fs-layer decryption decision and the inline crypto path use the correct (original inode's) key. With the COW inode no longer used at the read site, the use_cow flag has no remaining consumer; drop it from f2fs_write_begin() and prepare_atomic_write_begin().
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a41075acde0124d2f8a5f563068a5d63e8ffd57b
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a92332f32a8d31a7eee47b1dc1d751cb3319908f
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/f2fs/data.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "a92332f32a8d31a7eee47b1dc1d751cb3319908f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "591fc34e1f98b0d7eef4aa3440bfdff3c5a1cadd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "a41075acde0124d2f8a5f563068a5d63e8ffd57b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "591fc34e1f98b0d7eef4aa3440bfdff3c5a1cadd",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/f2fs/data.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.4"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.4",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.3",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2-rc1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: read COW data with the original inode during atomic write\n\nWhen updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the\npreviously written data back from the COW inode:\nprepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets\nuse_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:\n\n\tf2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)-\u003ecow_inode : inode,\n\t\t\t      ...);\n\nand f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption\n(STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via\nfscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto().\n\nHowever, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode\n(folio-\u003emapping-\u003ehost == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was\nencrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode\u0027s context, not\nthe COW inode\u0027s -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off\nfio-\u003epage-\u003emapping-\u003ehost.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise\noperates on folio-\u003emapping-\u003ehost.\n\nThe COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits\nits encryption policy from there.  With test_dummy_encryption the newly\ncreated COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a\npre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g.\nalready present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted.  The read\npath then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls\nfscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted\noriginal inode) has a NULL -\u003ei_crypt_info, dereferencing it:\n\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...\n  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]\n  RIP: 0010:fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks+0xa0/0x310\n  Workqueue: f2fs_post_read_wq f2fs_post_read_work\n  Call Trace:\n   fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x1eb/0x340\n   f2fs_post_read_work+0xba/0x140\n   process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a40\n   worker_thread+0x677/0xe90\n   kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0\n\nThe COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block\naddress is already resolved into @blkaddr by prepare_atomic_write_begin()\nvia __find_data_block(cow_inode, ...); f2fs_submit_page_read() then reads\nfrom that physical @blkaddr directly, so the inode argument only selects\nthe post-read crypto context, not which block is fetched.  Reading with\n@inode therefore returns the same (latest, not-yet-committed) COW data,\nwhile making both the fs-layer decryption decision and the inline crypto\npath use the correct (original inode\u0027s) key.\n\nWith the COW inode no longer used at the read site, the use_cow flag has no\nremaining consumer; drop it from f2fs_write_begin() and\nprepare_atomic_write_begin()."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-63811",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-19T12:16:54.023",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-07-19T12:16:54.023",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a41075acde0124d2f8a5f563068a5d63e8ffd57b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a92332f32a8d31a7eee47b1dc1d751cb3319908f"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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