FKIE_CVE-2026-59249

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-16 12:18 - Updated: 2026-10-24 21:10
Summary
Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP response smuggling) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on the same pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection. The Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 function in lib/mint/http1.ex parses the chunk-size line of a Transfer-Encoding: chunked response with Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG and forbids any sign prefix, but Integer.parse/2 accepts an optional leading + or -. A chunk-size line of +5 is accepted as a five-byte chunk; lines of +0 and -0 are accepted as the terminating zero-length chunk and end the message body early. An RFC-strict intermediary in the response path rejects these forms, so the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on where one response ends and the next begins. On a pooled keep-alive connection, an attacker-influenced origin can inject bytes that the client attributes to the next legitimate response on the same connection, poisoning the response queue and corrupting the responses returned to unrelated in-flight requests. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.3.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "mint",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mint",
          "product": "mint",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mint/http1.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027:decode_body/5"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint",
          "vendor": "elixir-mint",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "1.9.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.1.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "elixir-mint/mint",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/elixir-mint/mint",
          "product": "mint",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mint/http1.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.Mint.HTTP1\u0027:decode_body/5"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint",
          "vendor": "elixir-mint",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "fc7d16538db7e40b56ed489f08683225cb0197fa",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "60089586ec7adc9fddb09f69a2f5919ba9ac7f33",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP response smuggling) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on the same pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.\n\nThe Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 function in lib/mint/http1.ex parses the chunk-size line of a Transfer-Encoding: chunked response with Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG and forbids any sign prefix, but Integer.parse/2 accepts an optional leading + or -. A chunk-size line of +5 is accepted as a five-byte chunk; lines of +0 and -0 are accepted as the terminating zero-length chunk and end the message body early.\n\nAn RFC-strict intermediary in the response path rejects these forms, so the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on where one response ends and the next begins. On a pooled keep-alive connection, an attacker-influenced origin can inject bytes that the client attributes to the next legitimate response on the same connection, poisoning the response queue and corrupting the responses returned to unrelated in-flight requests.\n\nThis issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.3."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "La vulnerabilidad de interpretaci\u00f3n inconsistente de solicitudes HTTP (contrabando de respuestas HTTP) en elixir-mint mint permite a un servidor HTTP/1 malicioso desincronizar a un intermediario estricto y al cliente Mint en la misma conexi\u00f3n agrupada, lo que permite el envenenamiento de la cola de respuestas contra solicitudes subsiguientes que comparten la conexi\u00f3n.\n\nLa funci\u00f3n Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 en lib/mint/http1.ex analiza la l\u00ednea de tama\u00f1o de fragmento de una respuesta Transfer-Encoding: chunked con Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 define chunk-size = 1HEXDIG y proh\u00edbe cualquier prefijo de signo, pero Integer.parse/2 acepta un + o - inicial opcional. Una l\u00ednea de tama\u00f1o de fragmento de +5 se acepta como un fragmento de cinco bytes; las l\u00edneas de +0 y -0 se aceptan como el fragmento terminador de longitud cero y terminan el cuerpo del mensaje prematuramente.\n\nUn intermediario estricto seg\u00fan RFC en la ruta de respuesta rechaza estas formas, por lo que el intermediario y el cliente Mint no est\u00e1n de acuerdo sobre d\u00f3nde termina una respuesta y comienza la siguiente. En una conexi\u00f3n keep-alive agrupada, un origen influenciado por el atacante puede inyectar bytes que el cliente atribuye a la siguiente respuesta leg\u00edtima en la misma conexi\u00f3n, envenenando la cola de respuestas y corrompiendo las respuestas devueltas a solicitudes en curso no relacionadas.\n\nEste problema afecta a mint: desde 0.1.0 antes de 1.9.3."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-59249",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-24T21:10:00.130",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 6.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-59249",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-16T12:37:52.637521Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-16T12:18:07.170",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-59249.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/fc7d16538db7e40b56ed489f08683225cb0197fa"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/security/advisories/GHSA-x3x7-96vm-6h2w"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-59249"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/security/advisories/GHSA-x3x7-96vm-6h2w"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-444"
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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