FKIE_CVE-2026-55772
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-13 19:17 - Updated: 2026-07-21 19:17
Severity
Summary
CedarJava is an open source Java implementation of the Cedar policy language, used for fine-grained authorization decisions. In versions prior to 2.3.6, 3.4.1 and 4.9.0, under certain circumstances, improper input handling could allow Record-to-Entity type confusion across the Java-Rust FFI boundary. CedarJava sends authorization requests to the Rust cedar-policy evaluator as JSON. The JSON protocol reserves magic single-key object shapes (__entity and __extn) for entity references and extension values. When serializing a CedarMap, there is no validation preventing these reserved keys from being used. If an integrating service builds a CedarMap from caller-supplied key/value data (such as request headers, user-defined metadata, or resource tags), an actor who controls those keys could cause the Rust evaluator to interpret a record as an entity reference. This issue requires the integrating service to build a CedarMap where the an actor controls the keys, and a policy must reference that value in a when/unless clause. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 2.3.6, 3.4.1, and 4.9.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "cedar-java",
"vendor": "cedar-policy",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2.3.6"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 3.1.2, \u003c 3.4.1"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 4.9.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CedarJava is an open source Java implementation of the Cedar policy language, used for fine-grained authorization decisions. In versions prior to 2.3.6, 3.4.1 and 4.9.0, under certain circumstances, improper input handling could allow Record-to-Entity type confusion across the Java-Rust FFI boundary. CedarJava sends authorization requests to the Rust cedar-policy evaluator as JSON. The JSON protocol reserves magic single-key object shapes (__entity and __extn) for entity references and extension values. When serializing a CedarMap, there is no validation preventing these reserved keys from being used. If an integrating service builds a CedarMap from caller-supplied key/value data (such as request headers, user-defined metadata, or resource tags), an actor who controls those keys could cause the Rust evaluator to interpret a record as an entity reference. This issue requires the integrating service to build a CedarMap where the an actor controls the keys, and a policy must reference that value in a when/unless clause. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 2.3.6, 3.4.1, and 4.9."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-55772",
"lastModified": "2026-07-21T19:17:11.360",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-55772",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-21T19:02:38.661180Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-13T19:17:15.183",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/cedar-policy/cedar-java/security/advisories/GHSA-93g4-m6xv-cmvr"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-843"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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