FKIE_CVE-2026-55676
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-11 21:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 16:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Malcolm",
"vendor": "cisagov",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 26.06.1"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "26.06.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at `POST /server/php/submit.php` and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (`file-upload/php/config.php:16`), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the `.php` extension intact. Committed files land in `/var/www/upload/server/php/files` (`file-upload/php/config.php:7`), and the component\u0027s nginx routes any URL ending in `.php` to php-fpm. An authenticated `GET /server/php/files/\u003cname\u003e.php` then executes the uploaded code as `www-data`. Prior to version 26.06.1, in RBAC mode, the upload endpoint is reachable by the granular `ROLE_UPLOAD` role (`nginx/lua/nginx_auth_helpers.lua:71`), a role intended only for submitting capture files. As a result, a user holding the upload-only role runs arbitrary PHP as `www-data` inside the file-upload container. Version 26.06.1 fixes the issue."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Malcolm es un conjunto de herramientas de an\u00e1lisis de tr\u00e1fico de red. El componente de carga de archivos (backend PHP de FilePond) acepta cargas en POST /server/php/submit.php y las almacena en un directorio servido por la misma instancia de nginx y php-fpm. La lista de permitidos que deber\u00eda restringir los tipos de archivo aceptados es un array vac\u00edo por defecto (file-upload/php/config.php:16), por lo que la verificaci\u00f3n de tipo es una operaci\u00f3n nula y cada extensi\u00f3n es aceptada. El saneador de nombres de archivo mantiene la extensi\u00f3n .php intacta. Los archivos confirmados aterrizan en /var/www/upload/server/php/files (file-upload/php/config.php:7), y el nginx del componente enruta cualquier URL que termine en .php a php-fpm. Un GET /server/php/files/[name].php autenticado luego ejecuta el c\u00f3digo cargado como www-data. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 26.06.1, en modo RBAC, el endpoint de carga es accesible por el rol granular ROLE_UPLOAD (nginx/lua/nginx_auth_helpers.lua:71), un rol destinado solo para enviar archivos de captura. Como resultado, un usuario con el rol de solo carga ejecuta PHP arbitrario como www-data dentro del contenedor de carga de archivos. La versi\u00f3n 26.06.1 corrige el problema."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-55676",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T16:10:00.153",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 8.7,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-55676",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-12T22:09:13.650474Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-11T21:17:37.560",
"references": [
{
"source": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-230-01.json"
},
{
"source": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/Malcolm/releases/tag/v26.06.1"
},
{
"source": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/Malcolm/security/advisories/GHSA-8cvp-m7pg-qrp7"
},
{
"source": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-230-01"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-434"
}
],
"source": "ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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