FKIE_CVE-2026-54885
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-30 15:16 - Updated: 2026-10-23 22:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027"
],
"packageName": "boruta",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/boruta",
"product": "boruta",
"programFiles": [
"lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex",
"lib/boruta/openid.ex",
"lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth",
"vendor": "malach-it",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2.3.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:malach-it:boruta_auth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027"
],
"packageName": "malach-it/boruta_auth",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/malach-it/boruta_auth",
"product": "boruta",
"programFiles": [
"lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex",
"lib/boruta/openid.ex",
"lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base\u0027:fetch_unsigned_request/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Openid\u0027:parse_registration_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Boruta.Ecto.Clients\u0027:refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth",
"vendor": "malach-it",
"versions": [
{
"changes": [
{
"at": "001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"at": "95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5",
"status": "unaffected"
}
],
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "15455b86206e0370eabd64c1856a5c996b436455",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.\n\nThree code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |\u003e Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public ranges after DNS resolution, do not cap response size, and do not constrain redirects. An attacker can therefore steer the server\u0027s HTTP client at arbitrary network targets reachable from the Boruta host.\n\nThis issue affects boruta: from 2.3.2 before 2.3.7."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Una vulnerabilidad de falsificaci\u00f3n de petici\u00f3n del lado del servidor en malach-it Boruta permite a un atacante remoto no autenticado causar que el servidor de autorizaci\u00f3n OAuth/OpenID emita peticiones HTTP salientes a URIs elegidas por el atacante, incluyendo servicios internos y puntos finales de metadatos en la nube.\n\nTres rutas de c\u00f3digo obtienen URIs remotas suministradas por el solicitante sin validaci\u00f3n suficiente del objetivo. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 en lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex desreferencia el par\u00e1metro request_uri de OAuth de la petici\u00f3n de autorizaci\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |\u003e Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 en lib/boruta/openid.ex desreferencia la jwks_uri suministrada en una petici\u00f3n de registro de cliente din\u00e1mico de OpenID Connect. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 en lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex posteriormente actualiza la jwks_uri almacenada para un cliente existente. En las tres rutas, la \u00fanica validaci\u00f3n es que la URI se analiza con un esquema (y una de las dos cl\u00e1usulas de request_uri ni siquiera restringe el esquema a http o https). Las implementaciones no requieren HTTPS, no aplican una lista de permitidos de host o IP, no rechazan rangos de loopback, privados, link-local u otros rangos no p\u00fablicos despu\u00e9s de la resoluci\u00f3n DNS, no limitan el tama\u00f1o de la respuesta y no restringen las redirecciones. Un atacante puede, por lo tanto, dirigir el cliente HTTP del servidor a objetivos de red arbitrarios alcanzables desde el host de Boruta.\n\nEste problema afecta a boruta: desde 2.3.2 antes de 2.3.7."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-54885",
"lastModified": "2026-10-23T22:10:00.160",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-54885",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-30T16:14:18.216537Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-30T15:16:34.050",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-54885.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/001e3dc5c259e67c6f907e98867eda4141c96d0d"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/commit/95fb10b78129355e475681f324c9a01ef0af2be5"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-54885"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/malach-it/boruta_auth/security/advisories/GHSA-5q9h-vf5j-fr2g"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-918"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.