FKIE_CVE-2026-54353
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-26 21:16 - Updated: 2026-06-30 20:05
Severity
8.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
7.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
7.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/
Summary
Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.
References
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf | Exploit, Vendor Advisory | |
| 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf | Exploit, Vendor Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "budibase",
"vendor": "Budibase",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 3.39.9"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:budibase:budibase:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "37BF08E2-7EEE-4A61-A729-4B941DB885C5",
"versionEndExcluding": "3.39.9",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
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],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase\u0027s SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-54353",
"lastModified": "2026-06-30T20:05:11.687",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
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"scope": "CHANGED",
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"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 4.7,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
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"ssvcV203": [
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-29T13:17:27.293605Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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"published": "2026-06-26T21:16:35.417",
"references": [
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"tags": [
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"weaknesses": [
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"value": "CWE-367"
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"value": "CWE-918"
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],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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