FKIE_CVE-2026-54029
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-25 17:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 22:106.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/
| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat/security/advisories/GHSA-8892-xj8q-59xc | Exploit, Vendor Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "LibreChat",
"vendor": "danny-avila",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.8.4-rc1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:librechat:librechat:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "77B80F25-E7C2-442E-98E3-F4462C40C74F",
"versionEndIncluding": "0.8.3",
"vulnerable": true
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"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "LibreChat is an enhanced ChatGPT clone that supports multiple AI providers. Prior to 0.8.4-rc1, the DELETE /api/messages/:conversationId/:messageId endpoint allows any authenticated user to delete any other user\u0027s messages. The validateMessageReq middleware only validates that the conversationId belongs to the requesting user, but the handler calls deleteMessages({ messageId }) using only the messageId as the MongoDB filter \u2014 without adding a user constraint. An attacker provides their own valid conversationId (to pass validation) and the victim\u0027s messageId (to target deletion), resulting in permanent, irrecoverable message deletion. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.4-rc1."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "LibreChat es un clon mejorado de ChatGPT que soporta m\u00faltiples proveedores de IA. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 0.8.4-rc1, el endpoint DELETE /API/messages/:conversationId/:messageId permite a cualquier usuario autenticado eliminar los mensajes de cualquier otro usuario. El middleware validateMessageReq solo valida que el conversationId pertenezca al usuario solicitante, pero el gestor llama a deleteMessages({ messageId }) utilizando solo el messageId como filtro de MongoDB - sin a\u00f1adir una restricci\u00f3n de usuario. Un atacante proporciona su propio conversationId v\u00e1lido (para pasar la validaci\u00f3n) y el messageId de la v\u00edctima (para dirigir la eliminaci\u00f3n), lo que resulta en la eliminaci\u00f3n permanente e irrecuperable del mensaje. Esta vulnerabilidad se corrige en la versi\u00f3n 0.8.4-rc1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-54029",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T22:10:00.150",
"metrics": {
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{
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"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"version": "3.1"
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"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
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"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-26T17:50:49.675297Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
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"published": "2026-06-25T17:16:40.537",
"references": [
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"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat/security/advisories/GHSA-8892-xj8q-59xc"
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"weaknesses": [
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"value": "CWE-862"
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],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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