FKIE_CVE-2026-54025
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-25 17:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 22:10| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security-advisories@github.com | https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat/security/advisories/GHSA-3phr-62qf-cxf3 | Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory | |
| 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 | https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat/security/advisories/GHSA-3phr-62qf-cxf3 | Exploit, Mitigation, Vendor Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "LibreChat",
"vendor": "danny-avila",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.8.4-rc1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
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"nodes": [
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:librechat:librechat:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "98E22E73-154F-48CC-925E-61293CD7CDAB",
"versionEndIncluding": "0.7.8",
"vulnerable": true
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"operator": "OR"
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"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "LibreChat is an enhanced ChatGPT clone that supports multiple AI providers. Prior to 0.8.4-rc1, there is a vulnerability in LibreChat\u0027s markdown artifact preview pipeline. The marked library v15.0.12 does not HTML-escape double-quote characters in image alt text when a custom renderer falls through to the default renderer. LibreChat\u0027s generateMarkdownHtml function (in client/src/utils/markdown.ts) installs a custom image renderer that returns false for URLs passing the isSafeUrl allowlist check, which causes marked to fall back to its built-in renderer. That built-in renderer inserts the raw alt text into the alt=\"...\" attribute without escaping double-quote characters. An attacker can craft an alt text such as \" onload=\"payload to break out of the attribute and inject an arbitrary event handler. The resulting HTML is then assigned to document.getElementById(\u0027content\u0027).innerHTML inside the Sandpack preview iframe, causing the payload to execute in the victim\u0027s browser. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.4-rc1."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "LibreChat es un clon mejorado de ChatGPT que soporta m\u00faltiples proveedores de IA. Antes de 0.8.4-rc1, existe una vulnerabilidad en la canalizaci\u00f3n de vista previa de artefactos markdown de LibreChat. La biblioteca marked v15.0.12 no escapa en HTML los caracteres de comillas dobles en el texto alternativo de la imagen cuando un renderizador personalizado recurre al renderizador predeterminado. La funci\u00f3n generateMarkdownHtml de LibreChat (en client/src/utils/markdown.ts) instala un renderizador de im\u00e1genes personalizado que devuelve falso para las URL que pasan la verificaci\u00f3n de la lista de permitidos isSafeUrl, lo que hace que marked recurra a su renderizador incorporado. Ese renderizador incorporado inserta el texto alternativo sin procesar en el atributo alt=\u2019...\u2019 sin escapar los caracteres de comillas dobles. Un atacante puede crear un texto alternativo como \u201c onload_disabled=\u201dpayload para salir del atributo e inyectar un gestor de eventos arbitrario. El HTML resultante se asigna luego a document.getElementById(\u2019content\u2019).innerHTML dentro del iframe de vista previa de Sandpack, haciendo que la carga \u00fatil se ejecute en el navegador de la v\u00edctima. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en 0.8.4-rc1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-54025",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T22:10:00.150",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.4,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
"impactScore": 2.7,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
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"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
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"id": "CVE-2026-54025",
"options": [
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"exploitation": "poc"
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{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-25T18:02:07.544932Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-25T17:16:40.277",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Mitigation",
"Vendor Advisory"
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"url": "https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat/security/advisories/GHSA-3phr-62qf-cxf3"
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"url": "https://github.com/danny-avila/LibreChat/security/advisories/GHSA-3phr-62qf-cxf3"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-79"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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