FKIE_CVE-2026-53360
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-04 12:17 - Updated: 2026-07-04 12:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use
As per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area
to reside in the GHCB's shared buffer. Note, things like Page State Change
(PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length
when making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by
the size of the shared buffer.
Failure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a
malicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap
layout information.
setup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2),
where exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields
a 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer
holds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only
entries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds.
snp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253)
but NOT against the actual buffer size:
idx_end = hdr->end_entry;
if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) { // checks 253, not buffer
snp_complete_psc(svm, ...);
return 1;
}
for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) {
entry_start = entries[idx]; // OOB when idx >= 2
The guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+]
which are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry:
- The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle)
- If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes
cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806)
- If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent
memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest)
The guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range
(cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly
hit different slab positions.
By exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can:
- OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure)
- OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption)
- Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs
E.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module
produces 73 KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32
The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of
allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX)
Breakdown:
62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation)
7 slab-use-after-free
4 use-after-free
All credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer!
[sean: write changelog]
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4af663c2f64a8d252e690c60cf8b8abf22dc2951",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.93",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.35",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.12",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use\n\nAs per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area\nto reside in the GHCB\u0027s shared buffer. Note, things like Page State Change\n(PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can\u0027t provide a length\nwhen making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by\nthe size of the shared buffer.\n\nFailure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a\nmalicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap\nlayout information.\n\nsetup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2),\nwhere exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields\na 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer\nholds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only\nentries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds.\n\nsnp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253)\nbut NOT against the actual buffer size:\n\n idx_end = hdr-\u003eend_entry;\n\n if (idx_end \u003e= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) { // checks 253, not buffer\n snp_complete_psc(svm, ...);\n return 1;\n }\n\n for (idx = idx_start; idx \u003c= idx_end; idx++) {\n entry_start = entries[idx]; // OOB when idx \u003e= 2\n\nThe guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+]\nwhich are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry:\n\n - The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle)\n - If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes\n cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806)\n - If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent\n memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest)\n\nThe guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range\n(cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly\nhit different slab positions.\n\nBy exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can:\n - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure)\n - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption)\n - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs\n\nE.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module\nproduces 73 KASAN reports:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890\n Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32\n The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of\n allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX)\n\n Breakdown:\n 62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation)\n 7 slab-use-after-free\n 4 use-after-free\n\nAll credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer!\n\n[sean: write changelog]"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-53360",
"lastModified": "2026-07-04T12:17:01.880",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-07-04T12:17:01.880",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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