FKIE_CVE-2026-53038
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-24 17:17 - Updated: 2026-06-24 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos
ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id is initialized to
HASH_ALGO__LAST if the TPM algorithm is not supported. However there
are places relying on the algorithm to be valid because it is accessed
by hash_algo_name[].
On 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90
print_report+0xc4/0x580
? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80
? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
kasan_report+0xc2/0x100
? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440
ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300
ima_init+0x7d/0xd0
init_ima+0x28/0x100
do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0
kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740
kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9
^
ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9
ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
==================================================================
Seems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn't yet in
tpm_algorithms:
tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027
That's TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 == 0x0027 from "Trusted Platform Module 2.0
Library Part 2: Structures", page 51 [1].
See also the related U-Boot algorithms update [2].
Thus solve the problem by creating a file name with "_tpm_alg_<ID>"
postfix if the crypto algorithm isn't initialized.
This is how it looks on the test machine (patch ported to v6.12 release):
# ls -1 /sys/kernel/security/ima/
ascii_runtime_measurements
ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27
ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1
ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256
binary_runtime_measurements
binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27
binary_runtime_measurements_sha1
binary_runtime_measurements_sha256
policy
runtime_measurements_count
violations
[1]: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-2-Version-184_pub.pdf
[2]: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2024-July/558835.html
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "081b557cb56e1cfa8d1619b2601b01c53e3f418c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9fa8e76250082a45d0d3dad525419ab98bd01658",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b6766b171a5c4c33b26ff6fec530cb798db1f75e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9fa8e76250082a45d0d3dad525419ab98bd01658",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "88d4e89a39f0de07798ca3fd93bd1a9ea212a82e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9fa8e76250082a45d0d3dad525419ab98bd01658",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d7bd8cf0b348d3edae7bee33e74a32b21668b181",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9fa8e76250082a45d0d3dad525419ab98bd01658",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.10"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.10",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.91",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.33",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos\n\nima_tpm_chip-\u003eallocated_banks[i].crypto_id is initialized to\nHASH_ALGO__LAST if the TPM algorithm is not supported. However there\nare places relying on the algorithm to be valid because it is accessed\nby hash_algo_name[].\n\nOn 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name:\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440\n Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1\n\n CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90\n print_report+0xc4/0x580\n ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80\n ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440\n kasan_report+0xc2/0x100\n ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440\n create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440\n ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300\n ima_init+0x7d/0xd0\n init_ima+0x28/0x100\n do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0\n kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740\n kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0\n ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n The buggy address belongs to the variable:\n hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420\n\n Memory state around the buggy address:\n ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9\n ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n \u003effffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9\n ^\n ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9\n ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9\n ==================================================================\n\nSeems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn\u0027t yet in\ntpm_algorithms:\n tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027\n\nThat\u0027s TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 == 0x0027 from \"Trusted Platform Module 2.0\nLibrary Part 2: Structures\", page 51 [1].\nSee also the related U-Boot algorithms update [2].\n\nThus solve the problem by creating a file name with \"_tpm_alg_\u003cID\u003e\"\npostfix if the crypto algorithm isn\u0027t initialized.\n\nThis is how it looks on the test machine (patch ported to v6.12 release):\n # ls -1 /sys/kernel/security/ima/\n ascii_runtime_measurements\n ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27\n ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1\n ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256\n binary_runtime_measurements\n binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27\n binary_runtime_measurements_sha1\n binary_runtime_measurements_sha256\n policy\n runtime_measurements_count\n violations\n\n[1]: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-2-Version-184_pub.pdf\n[2]: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2024-July/558835.html"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-53038",
"lastModified": "2026-06-24T17:17:15.403",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-06-24T17:17:15.403",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/081b557cb56e1cfa8d1619b2601b01c53e3f418c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88d4e89a39f0de07798ca3fd93bd1a9ea212a82e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6766b171a5c4c33b26ff6fec530cb798db1f75e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7bd8cf0b348d3edae7bee33e74a32b21668b181"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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