FKIE_CVE-2026-52995
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-24 17:17 - Updated: 2026-06-24 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors
rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a
caller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and
then copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via
rds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor
actually wrote.
rds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only
write a subset of their output struct when the underlying
rds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl
and the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields
(max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size,
cache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and
cache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor
call and are then memcpy_to_user()'d out to user space.
struct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection
are the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are
not marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment
hole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor,
rds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of
their packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable,
but a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have
the same bug.
Reproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y:
a local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB,
binds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on
any netdev is sufficient), sendto()'s any peer on the same subnet
(fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS,
RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26
bytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers:
0..7 0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02 src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2
8..39 00 ... gids (memset-zeroed)
40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (max_send_wr)
48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max)
56..59 01 00 08 00 rdma_mr_size (garbage)
60..61 00 00 tos, sl
62..63 00 00 alignment padding
64..67 18 00 00 00 cache_allocs (garbage)
Fix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info()
and rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This
covers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future
visitors against the same class of bug.
No functional change for visitors that fully populate their output.
Changes in v2:
- retarget at the net tree (subject prefix "[PATCH net v2]",
net/rds: prefix in the title)
- pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and
Allison Henderson
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "81651e9d7dea1c048d2952f57632a042931d7b43",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0797b2e6901827694aa9c34c4c72118c8c97fba1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5e67cc262afb384e835c3327e9d954eeaedc6a87",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b6ba93a7b71ed443c9843eb12d27ed86f1e52694",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c7cb9eed8215a790f052f49cdccf577720d2bb62",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "91ce1bb6e4194dc2321748f68145359dcf86e350",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "912ba2e5704fdb8bc5decda96dfc1a57838f0099",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c88eb7e8d8397a8c1db59c425332c5a30b2a1682",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/rds/connection.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.30"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.30",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.258",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.209",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.175",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.141",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.91",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.33",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors\n\nrds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a\ncaller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and\nthen copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via\nrds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor\nactually wrote.\n\nrds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only\nwrite a subset of their output struct when the underlying\nrds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl\nand the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields\n(max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size,\ncache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and\ncache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor\ncall and are then memcpy_to_user()\u0027d out to user space.\n\nstruct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection\nare the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are\nnot marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment\nhole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor,\nrds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of\ntheir packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable,\nbut a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have\nthe same bug.\n\nReproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y:\na local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB,\nbinds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on\nany netdev is sufficient), sendto()\u0027s any peer on the same subnet\n(fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in\nRDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS,\nRDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26\nbytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers:\n\n 0..7 0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02 src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2\n 8..39 00 ... gids (memset-zeroed)\n 40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (max_send_wr)\n 48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max)\n 56..59 01 00 08 00 rdma_mr_size (garbage)\n 60..61 00 00 tos, sl\n 62..63 00 00 alignment padding\n 64..67 18 00 00 00 cache_allocs (garbage)\n\nFix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info()\nand rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This\ncovers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future\nvisitors against the same class of bug.\n\nNo functional change for visitors that fully populate their output.\n\nChanges in v2:\n- retarget at the net tree (subject prefix \"[PATCH net v2]\",\n net/rds: prefix in the title)\n- pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and\n Allison Henderson"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-52995",
"lastModified": "2026-06-24T17:17:10.423",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-06-24T17:17:10.423",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0797b2e6901827694aa9c34c4c72118c8c97fba1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e67cc262afb384e835c3327e9d954eeaedc6a87"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81651e9d7dea1c048d2952f57632a042931d7b43"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/912ba2e5704fdb8bc5decda96dfc1a57838f0099"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91ce1bb6e4194dc2321748f68145359dcf86e350"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6ba93a7b71ed443c9843eb12d27ed86f1e52694"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7cb9eed8215a790f052f49cdccf577720d2bb62"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c88eb7e8d8397a8c1db59c425332c5a30b2a1682"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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