FKIE_CVE-2026-52995

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-24 17:17 - Updated: 2026-06-24 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a caller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and then copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via rds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor actually wrote. rds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only write a subset of their output struct when the underlying rds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl and the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields (max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size, cache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and cache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor call and are then memcpy_to_user()'d out to user space. struct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection are the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are not marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment hole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor, rds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of their packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable, but a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have the same bug. Reproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y: a local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB, binds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on any netdev is sufficient), sendto()'s any peer on the same subnet (fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS, RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26 bytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers: 0..7 0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02 src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2 8..39 00 ... gids (memset-zeroed) 40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (max_send_wr) 48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max) 56..59 01 00 08 00 rdma_mr_size (garbage) 60..61 00 00 tos, sl 62..63 00 00 alignment padding 64..67 18 00 00 00 cache_allocs (garbage) Fix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This covers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future visitors against the same class of bug. No functional change for visitors that fully populate their output. Changes in v2: - retarget at the net tree (subject prefix "[PATCH net v2]", net/rds: prefix in the title) - pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and Allison Henderson
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/rds/connection.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "81651e9d7dea1c048d2952f57632a042931d7b43",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0797b2e6901827694aa9c34c4c72118c8c97fba1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5e67cc262afb384e835c3327e9d954eeaedc6a87",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b6ba93a7b71ed443c9843eb12d27ed86f1e52694",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c7cb9eed8215a790f052f49cdccf577720d2bb62",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "91ce1bb6e4194dc2321748f68145359dcf86e350",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "912ba2e5704fdb8bc5decda96dfc1a57838f0099",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c88eb7e8d8397a8c1db59c425332c5a30b2a1682",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ec16227e14141e4fd7ae76354c09dadfe2449d9e",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/rds/connection.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.30"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.30",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.10.258",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.209",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.175",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.141",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.91",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.33",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.0.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.0.10",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors\n\nrds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a\ncaller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and\nthen copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via\nrds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor\nactually wrote.\n\nrds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only\nwrite a subset of their output struct when the underlying\nrds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl\nand the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields\n(max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size,\ncache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and\ncache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor\ncall and are then memcpy_to_user()\u0027d out to user space.\n\nstruct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection\nare the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are\nnot marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment\nhole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor,\nrds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of\ntheir packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable,\nbut a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have\nthe same bug.\n\nReproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y:\na local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB,\nbinds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on\nany netdev is sufficient), sendto()\u0027s any peer on the same subnet\n(fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in\nRDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS,\nRDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26\nbytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers:\n\n    0..7   0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02     src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2\n    8..39  00 ...                      gids (memset-zeroed)\n    40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff     kernel pointer (max_send_wr)\n    48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff     kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max)\n    56..59 01 00 08 00                 rdma_mr_size (garbage)\n    60..61 00 00                       tos, sl\n    62..63 00 00                       alignment padding\n    64..67 18 00 00 00                 cache_allocs (garbage)\n\nFix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info()\nand rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This\ncovers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future\nvisitors against the same class of bug.\n\nNo functional change for visitors that fully populate their output.\n\nChanges in v2:\n- retarget at the net tree (subject prefix \"[PATCH net v2]\",\n  net/rds: prefix in the title)\n- pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and\n  Allison Henderson"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-52995",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-24T17:17:10.423",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-06-24T17:17:10.423",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0797b2e6901827694aa9c34c4c72118c8c97fba1"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e67cc262afb384e835c3327e9d954eeaedc6a87"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81651e9d7dea1c048d2952f57632a042931d7b43"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/912ba2e5704fdb8bc5decda96dfc1a57838f0099"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91ce1bb6e4194dc2321748f68145359dcf86e350"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6ba93a7b71ed443c9843eb12d27ed86f1e52694"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7cb9eed8215a790f052f49cdccf577720d2bb62"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c88eb7e8d8397a8c1db59c425332c5a30b2a1682"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}


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