FKIE_CVE-2026-52783

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-26 20:17 - Updated: 2026-10-25 17:10
Summary
OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.3.3 and 17.4.1, OpenProject's Storages module writes the OneDrive/SharePoint userless OAuth access_token plaintext to Rails.cache under the deterministic key storage.<id>.httpx_access_token, repopulated continuously by an hourly cron and every userless-OAuth call site (see Write cadence). None of the three allowed cache backends (file_store, memcache, redis) encrypts at rest. An attacker with read access to the cache backend recovers the Azure-AD application-tier bearer with an anonymous get over the memcached binary protocol (or the equivalent against Redis). This vulnerability is fixed in 17.3.3 and 17.4.1.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "openproject",
          "vendor": "opf",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 17.3.3"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 17.4.0, \u003c 17.4.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OpenProject is open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.3.3 and 17.4.1, OpenProject\u0027s Storages module writes the OneDrive/SharePoint userless OAuth access_token plaintext to Rails.cache under the deterministic key storage.\u003cid\u003e.httpx_access_token, repopulated continuously by an hourly cron and every userless-OAuth call site (see Write cadence). None of the three allowed cache backends (file_store, memcache, redis) encrypts at rest. An attacker with read access to the cache backend recovers the Azure-AD application-tier bearer with an anonymous get over the memcached binary protocol (or the equivalent against Redis). This vulnerability is fixed in 17.3.3 and 17.4.1."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "OpenProject es un software de gesti\u00f3n de proyectos de c\u00f3digo abierto y basado en la web. Antes de las versiones 17.3.3 y 17.4.1, el m\u00f3dulo de Almacenamientos de OpenProject escribe el access_token de OAuth sin usuario de OneDrive/SharePoint en texto plano en Rails.cache bajo la clave determinista storage.[id].httpx_access_token, repoblado continuamente por un cron horario y cada sitio de llamada de OAuth sin usuario (ver Cadencia de escritura). Ninguno de los tres backends de cach\u00e9 permitidos (file_store, memcache, redis) cifra en reposo. Un atacante con acceso de lectura al backend de cach\u00e9 recupera el bearer de nivel de aplicaci\u00f3n de Azure-AD con una solicitud \u2019get\u2019 an\u00f3nima sobre el protocolo binario de memcached (o el equivalente contra Redis). Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en las versiones 17.3.3 y 17.4.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-52783",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-25T17:10:00.197",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.8,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-52783",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-06-29T13:17:22.766027Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-26T20:17:18.860",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/opf/openproject/security/advisories/GHSA-h83w-5q5x-pq27"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-313"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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