FKIE_CVE-2026-49097

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-06 09:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 15:10
Summary
Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component. The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set IRC headers via the raw header names must use the CamelIrc* names (for example CamelIrcSendTo) instead of the old irc.* values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the irc.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the irc: producer (for example removeHeaders('irc.*') at the start of the route), and set the IRC destination from a trusted source.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
apache camel *
apache camel *
apache camel *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel-irc",
          "product": "Apache Camel",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.14.8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.18.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.15.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.21.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.19.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7662EB25-EAB6-493F-924C-5CA8A6F462B4",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.14.8",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.0.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "0AEE4159-4465-4ACD-B94A-1E4682C85270",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.18.3",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.15.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "1C2A1A7A-FADC-470F-8265-FA126AFD94ED",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.21.0",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.19.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (\u0027Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.\n\nThe camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component\u0027s other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set IRC headers via the raw header names must use the CamelIrc* names (for example CamelIrcSendTo) instead of the old irc.* values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the irc.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the irc: producer (for example removeHeaders(\u0027irc.*\u0027) at the start of the route), and set the IRC destination from a trusted source."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Validaci\u00f3n de entrada incorrecta, Neutralizaci\u00f3n incorrecta de elementos especiales en la salida utilizada por un componente descendente (\u2019Inyecci\u00f3n\u2019) vulnerabilidad en el componente IRC de Apache Camel.\n\nEl productor camel-irc elige el destino de un mensaje IRC saliente del encabezado de intercambio irc.sendTo (la constante IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, valor irc.sendTo); cuando ese encabezado est\u00e1 presente, anula la lista de canales configurada en el punto final, y el mensaje se env\u00eda solo al destino especificado. Este y los otros encabezados de control del componente (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) usaban valores simples, sin prefijo Camel. Debido a que estos nombres no comienzan con el prefijo Camel / camel, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - que bloquea solo el espacio de nombres del encabezado Camel en el l\u00edmite HTTP - los dej\u00f3 pasar de una solicitud HTTP entrante directamente al Intercambio. En una ruta que conecta un consumidor HTTP (por ejemplo, platform-http) a un productor irc:, cualquier cliente HTTP podr\u00eda, por lo tanto, establecer el encabezado irc.sendTo y redirigir un mensaje que la ruta pretend\u00eda para un canal configurado a un canal o usuario IRC arbitrario - exfiltrando el contenido del mensaje a un apodo elegido por el atacante, filtr\u00e1ndolo a un canal p\u00fablico, o entregando mensajes que parecen provenir del bot. No se requieren credenciales cuando el consumidor de puente no est\u00e1 autenticado.\nEste problema afecta a Apache Camel: desde 4.0.0 antes de 4.14.8, desde 4.15.0 antes de 4.18.3, desde 4.19.0 antes de 4.21.0.\n\nSe recomienda a los usuarios actualizar a la versi\u00f3n 4.21.0, que corrige el problema. Si los usuarios est\u00e1n en la rama de lanzamientos LTS 4.14.x, entonces se sugiere que actualicen a 4.14.8. Si los usuarios est\u00e1n en la rama de lanzamientos 4.18.x, entonces se sugiere que actualicen a 4.18.3. Despu\u00e9s de actualizar, las rutas que establecen encabezados IRC a trav\u00e9s de los nombres de encabezado sin procesar deben usar los nombres CamelIrc (por ejemplo, CamelIrcSendTo) en lugar de los antiguos valores irc.*. Para implementaciones que no pueden actualizar inmediatamente, elimine los encabezados irc.* de cualquier entrada no confiable antes del productor irc: (por ejemplo, removeHeaders(\u2019irc.*\u2019) al inicio de la ruta), y establezca el destino IRC desde una fuente confiable."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-49097",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-25T15:10:00.147",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 2.5,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-49097",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-06T19:02:00.670679Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-06T09:16:38.240",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-49097.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/05/22"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-20"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-74"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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