FKIE_CVE-2026-48086

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-06 22:17 - Updated: 2026-08-07 15:17
Severity
9.9 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the `GLOBAL_ADMIN` enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant's staff. No policy check enforces that "only an existing GLOBAL_ADMIN may grant GLOBAL_ADMIN", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants' configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "appointment-booking-software",
          "vendor": "open-reception",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.0.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OpenReception\u0027s appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, a TENANT_ADMIN promotes themselves to platform-wide GLOBAL_ADMIN through a single PUT request. The role-update handler accepts the `GLOBAL_ADMIN` enum value from any tenant admin updating their own tenant\u0027s staff. No policy check enforces that \"only an existing GLOBAL_ADMIN may grant GLOBAL_ADMIN\", so the schema validation IS the authorization decision. After re-login, the JWT contains the new role and the formerly-tenant-scoped admin reaches every other tenant on the platform. On the hosted OpenReception service this is a scope-changed escalation: a single customer-side tenant administrator gains full platform-wide administrative control over all other tenants\u0027 configuration, users, staff records, operational metadata, and tenant lifecycle. Plaintext appointment contents remain subject to the E2E model unless chained with the staff-crypto poisoning issue (V-4) or with staff-passkey hijacking (V-1). On a single-tenant self-hosted deployment it is still a privilege escalation because TENANT_ADMIN should not be able to create new tenants, modify global configuration, or manage other administrators. The same handler also accepts updates targeted at any colleague within the tenant. A tenant admin can promote a separate collaborator account instead of themselves, leaving their own audit trail clean while the platform-wide breach happens through a separate identity. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-48086",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-07T15:17:00.687",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.9,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-48086",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-08-07T14:36:33.558143Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-06T22:17:11.593",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/8525d35a41c31078d9f01c62e9687e653cf1a494"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-5qfr-7q4g-3469"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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