FKIE_CVE-2026-48075
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-06 22:17 - Updated: 2026-08-07 18:17
Severity
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel` endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller authentication. A request that supplies any valid `tunnelId` and any valid `emailHash` (the two need not belong to the same tunnel) results in an inserted appointment with `status = "CONFIRMED"`, attacker-controlled ciphertext fields, attacker-controlled date and duration, and an attacker-chosen agent. The endpoint validates only that some tunnel exists with the given `emailHash`, then writes the appointment using the attacker-supplied `tunnelId` directly. The `emailHash` lookup is effectively an existence check on the tenant; it does not authenticate the caller as the owner of the supplied `tunnelId`. Combined with the absence of any session, Authorization header, booking access token, or PoW, this makes the endpoint accept arbitrary appointment writes into arbitrary tunnels. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `create-new-client` (used to bootstrap a brand-new client tunnel) requires a Bearer bootstrap booking access token issued by the bootstrap-challenge / bootstrap-verify flow. The `add-to-tunnel` endpoint, intended for return-clients booking additional appointments, has no equivalent gate. The application's own middleware confirms this is intentional: `add-to-tunnel` is explicitly listed in the apiAuthHandle public-route allowlist alongside the bootstrap and challenge endpoints (which legitimately have no session). Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "appointment-booking-software",
"vendor": "open-reception",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.0.5"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "OpenReception\u0027s appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel` endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller authentication. A request that supplies any valid `tunnelId` and any valid `emailHash` (the two need not belong to the same tunnel) results in an inserted appointment with `status = \"CONFIRMED\"`, attacker-controlled ciphertext fields, attacker-controlled date and duration, and an attacker-chosen agent. The endpoint validates only that some tunnel exists with the given `emailHash`, then writes the appointment using the attacker-supplied `tunnelId` directly. The `emailHash` lookup is effectively an existence check on the tenant; it does not authenticate the caller as the owner of the supplied `tunnelId`. Combined with the absence of any session, Authorization header, booking access token, or PoW, this makes the endpoint accept arbitrary appointment writes into arbitrary tunnels. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `create-new-client` (used to bootstrap a brand-new client tunnel) requires a Bearer bootstrap booking access token issued by the bootstrap-challenge / bootstrap-verify flow. The `add-to-tunnel` endpoint, intended for return-clients booking additional appointments, has no equivalent gate. The application\u0027s own middleware confirms this is intentional: `add-to-tunnel` is explicitly listed in the apiAuthHandle public-route allowlist alongside the bootstrap and challenge endpoints (which legitimately have no session). Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-48075",
"lastModified": "2026-08-07T18:17:17.587",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 4.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-48075",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-07T17:14:46.685036Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-06T22:17:09.977",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/4522a44c001782848faff5529d7c1e2be7ac9ef5"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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