FKIE_CVE-2026-47724
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-23 21:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 13:10
Severity
Summary
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.4, the `/api/v1/*` route surface trusts the bearer token alone for authorisation on most endpoints. The codebase itself admits this at `internal/api/hosts.go:384`: "API trusts the bearer token for authorisation; per-CA ownership is enforced only in the Web layer." The Web UI gates state-changing routes through `loadAccessibleCA` (`internal/web/cas.go`); CA-management endpoints in `internal/api/cas.go` ALSO have proper `canAccessCA` gates. The gap is on the host, network, firewall, mobile-bundle, and most operator endpoints. Combined with the per-operator CA model from ADR 0002, this gives any non-admin operator API key broad cross-tenant access — instant privilege escalation in the worst case. Version 0.3.4 fixes the issue.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "nebula-mesh",
"vendor": "juev",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.3.4"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.4, the `/api/v1/*` route surface trusts the bearer token alone for authorisation on most endpoints. The codebase itself admits this at `internal/api/hosts.go:384`: \"API trusts the bearer token for authorisation; per-CA ownership is enforced only in the Web layer.\" The Web UI gates state-changing routes through `loadAccessibleCA` (`internal/web/cas.go`); CA-management endpoints in `internal/api/cas.go` ALSO have proper `canAccessCA` gates. The gap is on the host, network, firewall, mobile-bundle, and most operator endpoints. Combined with the per-operator CA model from ADR 0002, this gives any non-admin operator API key broad cross-tenant access \u2014 instant privilege escalation in the worst case. Version 0.3.4 fixes the issue."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "nebula-mesh es un plano de control autohospedado para la red privada virtual de malla Slack Nebula. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 0.3.4, la superficie de ruta \u2019/api/v1/*\u2019 conf\u00eda \u00fanicamente en el token de portador para la autorizaci\u00f3n en la mayor\u00eda de los puntos finales. El propio c\u00f3digo fuente admite esto en \u201cinternal/api/hosts.go:384\u201d: \u2019La API conf\u00eda en el token de portador para la autorizaci\u00f3n; la propiedad por CA se aplica solo en la capa web.\u2019 La interfaz de usuario web protege las rutas que cambian de estado a trav\u00e9s de \u201cloadAccessibleCA\u201d (\u201cinternal/web/cas.go\u201d); los puntos finales de gesti\u00f3n de CA en \u201cinternal/api/cas.go\u201d TAMBI\u00c9N tienen puertas \u201ccanAccessCA\u201d adecuadas. La brecha est\u00e1 en los puntos finales de host, red, cortafuegos, paquete m\u00f3vil y la mayor\u00eda de los operadores. Combinado con el modelo de CA por operador de ADR 0002, esto otorga a cualquier clave API de operador no administrador un amplio acceso entre inquilinos - escalada de privilegios instant\u00e1nea en el peor de los casos. La versi\u00f3n 0.3.4 soluciona el problema."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-47724",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T13:10:00.147",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.9,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-47724",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-28T14:29:11.247252Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-23T21:17:04.477",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/9d8bcd7667ecd0c2975cc71fb35a02fe131f76f2"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-598g-h2vc-h5vg"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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