FKIE_CVE-2026-46591
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-06 09:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 15:10| URL | Tags | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| security@apache.org | https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46591.html | Vendor Advisory |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel-neo4j",
"product": "Apache Camel",
"vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.14.8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.10.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.18.3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.15.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.21.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.19.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@apache.org"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "CD453DD1-65B8-49D0-BB84-3D585163C326",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.14.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.10.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "0AEE4159-4465-4ACD-B94A-1E4682C85270",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.18.3",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.15.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "1C2A1A7A-FADC-470F-8265-FA126AFD94ED",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.21.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "4.19.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic vulnerability in Apache Camel Neo4J component.\n\nThe camel-neo4j producer builds the Cypher WHERE clause for its match/retrieve and delete operations from the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map. CVE-2025-66169 addressed Cypher injection through the property values by binding them as query parameters ($paramN), but the property names (the JSON keys of that map) were still concatenated into the query string verbatim in Neo4jProducer.retrieveNodes() and deleteNode(). A property name containing Cypher syntax therefore alters the structure of the executed query. Where a route maps untrusted input into the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map - for example by passing a request body as the match map, or from a consumer that does not filter inbound Camel* headers - an attacker who controls the JSON key names can inject arbitrary Cypher and read, modify or delete any node or relationship in the Neo4j database. The CamelNeo4jMatchProperties header is itself Camel-prefixed and is filtered by the HTTP header-filter strategy, so a plain HTTP client cannot set it directly; the issue is reachable through routes that deliberately or inadvertently carry untrusted data into that header.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.10.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not populate the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties map from untrusted input: validate or allow-list the property names (for example against ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$) before the Neo4j producer, and ensure that any consumer feeding such a route filters inbound Camel* / camel* headers so the match header cannot be supplied by an external sender."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Vulnerabilidad de Neutralizaci\u00f3n Incorrecta de Elementos Especiales en la L\u00f3gica de Consulta de Datos en el componente Apache Camel Neo4J.\n\nEl productor camel-neo4j construye la cl\u00e1usula WHERE de Cypher para sus operaciones de coincidencia/recuperaci\u00f3n y eliminaci\u00f3n a partir del mapa CamelNeo4jMatchProperties. CVE-2025-66169 abord\u00f3 la inyecci\u00f3n de Cypher a trav\u00e9s de los valores de las propiedades al vincularlos como par\u00e1metros de consulta ($paramN), pero los nombres de las propiedades (las claves JSON de ese mapa) a\u00fan se concatenaban en la cadena de consulta textualmente en Neo4jProducer.retrieveNodes() y deleteNode(). Un nombre de propiedad que contiene sintaxis Cypher, por lo tanto, altera la estructura de la consulta ejecutada. Donde una ruta mapea entrada no confiable en el mapa CamelNeo4jMatchProperties - por ejemplo, pasando un cuerpo de solicitud como el mapa de coincidencia, o desde un consumidor que no filtra los encabezados Camel entrantes - un atacante que controla los nombres de las claves JSON puede inyectar Cypher arbitrario y leer, modificar o eliminar cualquier nodo o relaci\u00f3n en la base de datos Neo4j. El encabezado CamelNeo4jMatchProperties tiene prefijo Camel y es filtrado por la estrategia de filtro de encabezados HTTP, por lo que un cliente HTTP simple no puede establecerlo directamente; el problema es alcanzable a trav\u00e9s de rutas que deliberada o inadvertidamente llevan datos no confiables a ese encabezado.\nEste problema afecta a Apache Camel: desde 4.10.0 antes de 4.14.8, desde 4.15.0 antes de 4.18.3, desde 4.19.0 antes de 4.21.0.\n\nSe recomienda a los usuarios actualizar a la versi\u00f3n 4.21.0, que corrige el problema. Si los usuarios est\u00e1n en la rama de lanzamientos LTS 4.14.x, entonces se sugiere que actualicen a 4.14.8. Si los usuarios est\u00e1n en la rama de lanzamientos 4.18.x, entonces se sugiere que actualicen a 4.18.3. Para implementaciones que no pueden actualizarse inmediatamente, no rellene el mapa CamelNeo4jMatchProperties con entrada no confiable: valide o incluya en una lista blanca los nombres de las propiedades (por ejemplo, contra ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$) antes del productor Neo4j, y aseg\u00farese de que cualquier consumidor que alimente dicha ruta filtre los encabezados Camel / camel entrantes para que el encabezado de coincidencia no pueda ser proporcionado por un remitente externo."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-46591",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T15:10:00.147",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 4.2,
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-46591",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-06T19:20:49.095923Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-06T09:16:37.263",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@apache.org",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46591.html"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-943"
}
],
"source": "security@apache.org",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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