FKIE_CVE-2026-46585

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-06 09:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 15:10
Summary
Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Lucene Component. The camel-lucene producer reads the search phrase from an Exchange header (LuceneConstants.HEADER_QUERY) whose value was the plain string QUERY (and RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS for HEADER_RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS). Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that exposes a Lucene query operation behind an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http), any HTTP client could therefore set the QUERY header and have its value executed against the full-text index, overriding the query the route intended to run. Depending on what is indexed, this allows reading documents the request should not have access to (for example a match-all query returns the entire index, or the route's intended per-user filter can be replaced), and expensive regular-expression queries can consume significant CPU. No credentials are required when the HTTP consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set the query via the raw header name must use CamelLuceneQuery (and CamelLuceneReturnLuceneDocs) instead of QUERY / RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the attacker-controllable headers before the Lucene producer and set the query from a trusted source (for example removeHeader('QUERY') and removeHeader('RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS'), then setHeader('QUERY', constant(...)) at the start of the route).
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
apache camel *
apache camel *
apache camel *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel-lucene",
          "product": "Apache Camel Lucene",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.14.8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.18.3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.15.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.21.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.19.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7662EB25-EAB6-493F-924C-5CA8A6F462B4",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.14.8",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.0.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "0AEE4159-4465-4ACD-B94A-1E4682C85270",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.18.3",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.15.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "1C2A1A7A-FADC-470F-8265-FA126AFD94ED",
              "versionEndExcluding": "4.21.0",
              "versionStartIncluding": "4.19.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Lucene Component.\n\nThe camel-lucene producer reads the search phrase from an Exchange header (LuceneConstants.HEADER_QUERY) whose value was the plain string QUERY (and RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS for HEADER_RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS). Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that exposes a Lucene query operation behind an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http), any HTTP client could therefore set the QUERY header and have its value executed against the full-text index, overriding the query the route intended to run. Depending on what is indexed, this allows reading documents the request should not have access to (for example a match-all query returns the entire index, or the route\u0027s intended per-user filter can be replaced), and expensive regular-expression queries can consume significant CPU. No credentials are required when the HTTP consumer is unauthenticated.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set the query via the raw header name must use CamelLuceneQuery (and CamelLuceneReturnLuceneDocs) instead of QUERY / RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the attacker-controllable headers before the Lucene producer and set the query from a trusted source (for example removeHeader(\u0027QUERY\u0027) and removeHeader(\u0027RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS\u0027), then setHeader(\u0027QUERY\u0027, constant(...)) at the start of the route)."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Vulnerabilidad de validaci\u00f3n de entrada incorrecta, omisi\u00f3n de autorizaci\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de clave controlada por el usuario en el componente Apache Camel Lucene.\n\nEl productor camel-lucene lee la frase de b\u00fasqueda de una cabecera de Exchange (LuceneConstants.HEADER_QUERY) cuyo valor era la cadena simple QUERY (y RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS para HEADER_RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS). Debido a que estos nombres no comienzan con el prefijo Camel / camel, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - que bloquea solo el espacio de nombres de cabecera Camel en el l\u00edmite HTTP - los dej\u00f3 pasar de una solicitud HTTP entrante directamente al Exchange. En una ruta que expone una operaci\u00f3n de consulta Lucene detr\u00e1s de un consumidor HTTP (por ejemplo, platform-http), cualquier cliente HTTP podr\u00eda, por lo tanto, establecer la cabecera QUERY y hacer que su valor se ejecute contra el \u00edndice de texto completo, anulando la consulta que la ruta pretend\u00eda ejecutar. Dependiendo de lo que est\u00e9 indexado, esto permite leer documentos a los que la solicitud no deber\u00eda tener acceso (por ejemplo, una consulta de coincidencia total devuelve el \u00edndice completo, o el filtro por usuario previsto de la ruta puede ser reemplazado), y las consultas costosas de expresiones regulares pueden consumir una CPU significativa. No se requieren credenciales cuando el consumidor HTTP no est\u00e1 autenticado.\nEste problema afecta a Apache Camel: desde 4.0.0 antes de 4.14.8, desde 4.15.0 antes de 4.18.3, desde 4.19.0 antes de 4.21.0.\n\nSe recomienda a los usuarios actualizar a la versi\u00f3n 4.21.0, que corrige el problema. Si los usuarios est\u00e1n en la rama de versiones LTS 4.14.x, entonces se les sugiere actualizar a 4.14.8. Si los usuarios est\u00e1n en la rama de versiones 4.18.x, entonces se les sugiere actualizar a 4.18.3. Despu\u00e9s de actualizar, las rutas que establecen la consulta a trav\u00e9s del nombre de cabecera sin procesar deben usar CamelLuceneQuery (y CamelLuceneReturnLuceneDocs) en lugar de QUERY / RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS. Para implementaciones que no pueden actualizar inmediatamente, elimine las cabeceras controlables por el atacante antes del productor Lucene y establezca la consulta desde una fuente confiable (por ejemplo, removeHeader(\u2019QUERY\u2019) y removeHeader(\u2019RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS\u2019), luego setHeader(\u2019QUERY\u2019, constant(...)) al inicio de la ruta)."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-46585",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-25T15:10:00.147",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-46585",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-06T19:24:25.722933Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-06T09:16:37.030",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46585.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/05/12"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-20"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-639"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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