FKIE_CVE-2026-46423

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-24 21:16 - Updated: 2026-10-25 22:10
Severity
9.3 (Critical) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Summary
Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's SAML service provider implementation silently skips both SAML Response and Assertion signature validation when the configured IdP certificate field is empty. The verifySignatures routine performs an early return when serviceProviderOptions.cert is falsy, which is the default state of the setting. Because provider registration only gates on the SAML "enabled" toggle and not on the presence of a certificate, an administrator who enables SAML without pasting an IdP certificate obtains a fully wired, publicly reachable SAML login endpoint that accepts unsigned or attacker-supplied assertions. This is a default-configuration authentication-bypass class: the fail-open branch is reached with no misconfiguration beyond leaving a field at its shipped default. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat/security/advisories/GHSA-rgg7-qvp9-wvx7
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "Rocket.Chat",
          "vendor": "RocketChat",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.5.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.5.0"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.4.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.4.1"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.3.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.3.3"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.2.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.2.3"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.1.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.1.4"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.0.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.0.5"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 7.11.0-rc.0, \u003c 7.13.7"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 7.10.11"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat\u0027s SAML service provider implementation silently skips both SAML Response and Assertion signature validation when the configured IdP certificate field is empty. The verifySignatures routine performs an early return when serviceProviderOptions.cert is falsy, which is the default state of the setting. Because provider registration only gates on the SAML \"enabled\" toggle and not on the presence of a certificate, an administrator who enables SAML without pasting an IdP certificate obtains a fully wired, publicly reachable SAML login endpoint that accepts unsigned or attacker-supplied assertions. This is a default-configuration authentication-bypass class: the fail-open branch is reached with no misconfiguration beyond leaving a field at its shipped default. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Rocket.Chat es una plataforma de comunicaciones de c\u00f3digo abierto, segura y totalmente personalizable. Antes de 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7 y 7.10.11, la implementaci\u00f3n del proveedor de servicios SAML de Rocket.Chat omite silenciosamente la validaci\u00f3n de firma tanto de la Respuesta SAML como de la Aserci\u00f3n cuando el campo del certificado IdP configurado est\u00e1 vac\u00edo. La rutina verifySignatures realiza un retorno anticipado cuando serviceProviderOptions.cert es falso, que es el estado predeterminado de la configuraci\u00f3n. Debido a que el registro del proveedor solo se basa en el interruptor \u2019habilitado\u2019 de SAML y no en la presencia de un certificado, un administrador que habilita SAML sin pegar un certificado IdP obtiene un punto final de inicio de sesi\u00f3n SAML completamente configurado y accesible p\u00fablicamente que acepta aserciones sin firmar o proporcionadas por el atacante. Esta es una clase de omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n por configuraci\u00f3n predeterminada: se alcanza la rama de falla abierta sin ninguna mala configuraci\u00f3n m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de dejar un campo en su valor predeterminado de f\u00e1brica. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7 y 7.10.11."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-46423",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-25T22:10:00.150",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 9.3,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-46423",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-06-25T00:00:00+00:00",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-24T21:16:54.223",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat/security/advisories/GHSA-rgg7-qvp9-wvx7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-347"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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