FKIE_CVE-2026-46412
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-20 16:17 - Updated: 2026-10-24 20:10
Severity
Summary
@beproduct/nestjs-auth is a NestJS authentication module for BeProduct IDS (Identity Server) with OpenID Connect support. Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The postinstall payload attempted to harvest npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`); GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens; AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`); HashiCorp Vault tokens; and other secrets present in environment variables. Version `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the original `0.1.1` source tree. Anyone who installed any version in the range `>=0.1.2 <=0.1.19` should remove the package and clean the npm cache; install the clean version; rotate every credential present in the install environment, including all npm publish tokens, all GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens, AWS access keys, HashiCorp Vault tokens, and any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time; scan affected hosts for indicators of compromise and, if any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage; and check committed repository history for unexpected additions in `.claude/` or `.vscode/` directories. The worm is known to commit `setup.mjs` + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "beproduct-org-nestjs-auth",
"vendor": "BeProduct",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 0.1.2, \u003c= 0.1.19"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "@beproduct/nestjs-auth is a NestJS authentication module for BeProduct IDS (Identity Server) with OpenID Connect support. Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The postinstall payload attempted to harvest npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`); GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens; AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`); HashiCorp Vault tokens; and other secrets present in environment variables. Version `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the original `0.1.1` source tree. Anyone who installed any version in the range `\u003e=0.1.2 \u003c=0.1.19` should remove the package and clean the npm cache; install the clean version; rotate every credential present in the install environment, including all npm publish tokens, all GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens, AWS access keys, HashiCorp Vault tokens, and any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time; scan affected hosts for indicators of compromise and, if any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage; and check committed repository history for unexpected additions in `.claude/` or `.vscode/` directories. The worm is known to commit `setup.mjs` + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "\u201c@beproduct/nestjs-auth\u201d es un m\u00f3dulo de autenticaci\u00f3n de NestJS para BeProduct IDS (Identity Server) con soporte OpenID Connect. Entre el 11-05-2026 20:19 UTC y las 22:56 UTC, un atacante utiliz\u00f3 un token de publicaci\u00f3n de npm comprometido para publicar 18 versiones maliciosas de \u201c@beproduct/nestjs-auth\u201d (0.1.2 a 0.1.19). La carga \u00fatil de postinstalaci\u00f3n intent\u00f3 recolectar tokens de npm (de \u201c~/.npmrc\u201d); tokens de acceso personal de GitHub, tokens de OAuth (\u201cgho_*\u201d), y tokens OIDC de Actions; credenciales de AWS (de variables de entorno y \u201c~/.aws/credentials\u201d); tokens de HashiCorp Vault; y otros secretos presentes en las variables de entorno. La versi\u00f3n \u201c0.1.20\u201d es una republicaci\u00f3n limpia del \u00e1rbol de c\u00f3digo fuente original \u201c0.1.1\u201d. Cualquiera que haya instalado cualquier versi\u00f3n en el rango \u201c\u003e=0.1.2 menor o igual que 0.1.19\u201d deber\u00eda eliminar el paquete y limpiar la cach\u00e9 de npm; instalar la versi\u00f3n limpia; rotar cada credencial presente en el entorno de instalaci\u00f3n, incluyendo todos los tokens de publicaci\u00f3n de npm, todos los PATs y tokens de OAuth de GitHub, claves de acceso de AWS, tokens de HashiCorp Vault, y cualquier otro secreto que estuviera en las variables de entorno o archivos de configuraci\u00f3n en el momento de la instalaci\u00f3n; escanear los hosts afectados en busca de indicadores de compromiso y, si se encuentra alguno, tratar el host como comprometido y reinstalar la imagen; y verificar el historial del repositorio en busca de adiciones inesperadas en los directorios \u201c.claude/\u201d o \u201c.vscode/\u201d. Se sabe que el gusano realiza commits de \u201csetup.mjs\u201d + configuraciones de hook a las ramas de PR a trav\u00e9s de tiempos de ejecuci\u00f3n de agentes automatizados."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-46412",
"lastModified": "2026-10-24T20:10:00.137",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 10.0,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-46412",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-20T15:32:17.643031Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-20T16:17:01.000",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/BeProduct/beproduct-org-nestjs-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-6xwp-cp5h-q856"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://www.aikido.dev/blog/checklist-github-actions"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-506"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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