FKIE_CVE-2026-46169
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-28 10:16 - Updated: 2026-05-28 13:44
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: fix uninit-value by validating catalog record size
Syzbot reported a KMSAN uninit-value issue in hfsplus_strcasecmp(). The
root cause is that hfs_brec_read() doesn't validate that the on-disk
record size matches the expected size for the record type being read.
When mounting a corrupted filesystem, hfs_brec_read() may read less data
than expected. For example, when reading a catalog thread record, the
debug output showed:
HFSPLUS_BREC_READ: rec_len=520, fd->entrylength=26
HFSPLUS_BREC_READ: WARNING - entrylength (26) < rec_len (520) - PARTIAL READ!
hfs_brec_read() only validates that entrylength is not greater than the
buffer size, but doesn't check if it's less than expected. It successfully
reads 26 bytes into a 520-byte structure and returns success, leaving 494
bytes uninitialized.
This uninitialized data in tmp.thread.nodeName then gets copied by
hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() and used by hfsplus_strcasecmp(), triggering
the KMSAN warning when the uninitialized bytes are used as array indices
in case_fold().
Fix by introducing hfsplus_brec_read_cat() wrapper that:
1. Calls hfs_brec_read() to read the data
2. Validates the record size based on the type field:
- Fixed size for folder and file records
- Variable size for thread records (depends on string length)
3. Returns -EIO if size doesn't match expected
For thread records, check against HFSPLUS_MIN_THREAD_SZ before reading
nodeName.length to avoid reading uninitialized data at call sites that
don't zero-initialize the entry structure.
Also initialize the tmp variable in hfsplus_find_cat() as defensive
programming to ensure no uninitialized data even if validation is
bypassed.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhfsplus: fix uninit-value by validating catalog record size\n\nSyzbot reported a KMSAN uninit-value issue in hfsplus_strcasecmp(). The\nroot cause is that hfs_brec_read() doesn\u0027t validate that the on-disk\nrecord size matches the expected size for the record type being read.\n\nWhen mounting a corrupted filesystem, hfs_brec_read() may read less data\nthan expected. For example, when reading a catalog thread record, the\ndebug output showed:\n\n HFSPLUS_BREC_READ: rec_len=520, fd-\u003eentrylength=26\n HFSPLUS_BREC_READ: WARNING - entrylength (26) \u003c rec_len (520) - PARTIAL READ!\n\nhfs_brec_read() only validates that entrylength is not greater than the\nbuffer size, but doesn\u0027t check if it\u0027s less than expected. It successfully\nreads 26 bytes into a 520-byte structure and returns success, leaving 494\nbytes uninitialized.\n\nThis uninitialized data in tmp.thread.nodeName then gets copied by\nhfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() and used by hfsplus_strcasecmp(), triggering\nthe KMSAN warning when the uninitialized bytes are used as array indices\nin case_fold().\n\nFix by introducing hfsplus_brec_read_cat() wrapper that:\n1. Calls hfs_brec_read() to read the data\n2. Validates the record size based on the type field:\n - Fixed size for folder and file records\n - Variable size for thread records (depends on string length)\n3. Returns -EIO if size doesn\u0027t match expected\n\nFor thread records, check against HFSPLUS_MIN_THREAD_SZ before reading\nnodeName.length to avoid reading uninitialized data at call sites that\ndon\u0027t zero-initialize the entry structure.\n\nAlso initialize the tmp variable in hfsplus_find_cat() as defensive\nprogramming to ensure no uninitialized data even if validation is\nbypassed."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-46169",
"lastModified": "2026-05-28T13:44:01.663",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-05-28T10:16:32.537",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61a790974ff7e533acbceca06c7d02f22bf96d4d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93e8d613f1a01b6637f387cc93f184cf7fb881d6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a420904450962a562ad053a41a53a27755021b48"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6b592275aeff184aa82fcf6abccd833fb71b393"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c91bbd6193c70a02c50c22e0fb1f60c3c5bd053a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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