FKIE_CVE-2026-46151

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-28 10:16 - Updated: 2026-05-28 13:44
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: usblp: fix heap leak in IEEE 1284 device ID via short response usblp_ctrl_msg() collapses the usb_control_msg() return value to 0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred. A broken printer can complete the GET_DEVICE_ID control transfer short and the driver has no way to know. usblp_cache_device_id_string() reads the 2-byte big-endian length prefix from the response and trusts it (clamped only to the buffer bounds). The buffer is kmalloc(1024) at probe time. A device that sends exactly two bytes (e.g. 0x03 0xFF, claiming a 1023-byte ID) leaves device_id_string[2..1022] holding stale kmalloc heap. That stale data is then exposed: - via the ieee1284_id sysfs attribute (sprintf("%s", buf+2), truncated at the first NUL in the stale heap), and - via the IOCNR_GET_DEVICE_ID ioctl, which copy_to_user()s the full claimed length regardless of NULs, up to 1021 bytes of uninitialized heap, with the leak size chosen by the device. Fix this up by just zapping the buffer with zeros before each request sent to the device.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/522d17e93a85575256894212d10e5a1fa6f36529
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d8142141c942c0d8e79343cffda9c44bb1f3f4f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e29c32a27218f2dcd4a4e9b0b3c5e7728640698
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a400c6fe3617e31e690e3f7ca37bb335e0498f3
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8247f52d822180e94ccbfdab91613af386a4e34d
Impacted products
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: usblp: fix heap leak in IEEE 1284 device ID via short response\n\nusblp_ctrl_msg() collapses the usb_control_msg() return value to\n0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred.  A broken\nprinter can complete the GET_DEVICE_ID control transfer short and the\ndriver has no way to know.\n\nusblp_cache_device_id_string() reads the 2-byte big-endian length prefix\nfrom the response and trusts it (clamped only to the buffer bounds).\nThe buffer is kmalloc(1024) at probe time. A device that sends exactly\ntwo bytes (e.g. 0x03 0xFF, claiming a 1023-byte ID) leaves\ndevice_id_string[2..1022] holding stale kmalloc heap.\n\nThat stale data is then exposed:\n  - via the ieee1284_id sysfs attribute (sprintf(\"%s\", buf+2), truncated\n    at the first NUL in the stale heap), and\n  - via the IOCNR_GET_DEVICE_ID ioctl, which copy_to_user()s the full\n    claimed length regardless of NULs, up to 1021 bytes of uninitialized\n    heap, with the leak size chosen by the device.\n\nFix this up by just zapping the buffer with zeros before each request\nsent to the device."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-46151",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-28T13:44:01.663",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-05-28T10:16:30.723",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/522d17e93a85575256894212d10e5a1fa6f36529"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d8142141c942c0d8e79343cffda9c44bb1f3f4f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e29c32a27218f2dcd4a4e9b0b3c5e7728640698"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a400c6fe3617e31e690e3f7ca37bb335e0498f3"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8247f52d822180e94ccbfdab91613af386a4e34d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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