FKIE_CVE-2026-46081

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-27 14:17 - Updated: 2026-05-27 14:48
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: acomp - fix wrong pointer stored by acomp_save_req() acomp_save_req() stores &req->chain in req->base.data. When acomp_reqchain_done() is invoked on asynchronous completion, it receives &req->chain as the data argument but casts it directly to struct acomp_req. Since data points to the chain member, all subsequent field accesses are at a wrong offset, resulting in memory corruption. The issue occurs when an asynchronous hardware implementation, such as the QAT driver, completes a request that uses the DMA virtual address interface (e.g. acomp_request_set_src_dma()). This combination causes crypto_acomp_compress() to enter the acomp_do_req_chain() path, which sets acomp_reqchain_done() as the completion callback via acomp_save_req(). With KASAN enabled, this manifests as a general protection fault in acomp_reqchain_done(): general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe000040000000000 KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000400000000000-0x0000400000000007] RIP: 0010:acomp_reqchain_done+0x15b/0x4e0 Call Trace: <IRQ> qat_comp_alg_callback+0x5d/0xa0 [intel_qat] adf_ring_response_handler+0x376/0x8b0 [intel_qat] adf_response_handler+0x60/0x170 [intel_qat] tasklet_action_common+0x223/0x820 handle_softirqs+0x1ab/0x640 </IRQ> Fix this by storing the request itself in req->base.data instead of &req->chain, so that acomp_reqchain_done() receives the correct pointer. Simplify acomp_restore_req() accordingly to access req->chain directly.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a2785e5985627f2265ba7775949601a29ba0d1e
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/343a5bf68a8ff9affcf2b70677ea4cf40c195ee4
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7e20b9bd6c990773cf0c09e2642250b8a70263d
Impacted products
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: acomp - fix wrong pointer stored by acomp_save_req()\n\nacomp_save_req() stores \u0026req-\u003echain in req-\u003ebase.data. When\nacomp_reqchain_done() is invoked on asynchronous completion, it receives\n\u0026req-\u003echain as the data argument but casts it directly to struct\nacomp_req. Since data points to the chain member, all subsequent field\naccesses are at a wrong offset, resulting in memory corruption.\n\nThe issue occurs when an asynchronous hardware implementation, such as\nthe QAT driver, completes a request that uses the DMA virtual address\ninterface (e.g. acomp_request_set_src_dma()). This combination causes\ncrypto_acomp_compress() to enter the acomp_do_req_chain() path, which\nsets acomp_reqchain_done() as the completion callback via\nacomp_save_req().\n\nWith KASAN enabled, this manifests as a general protection fault in\nacomp_reqchain_done():\n\n  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe000040000000000\n  KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000400000000000-0x0000400000000007]\n  RIP: 0010:acomp_reqchain_done+0x15b/0x4e0\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cIRQ\u003e\n   qat_comp_alg_callback+0x5d/0xa0 [intel_qat]\n   adf_ring_response_handler+0x376/0x8b0 [intel_qat]\n   adf_response_handler+0x60/0x170 [intel_qat]\n   tasklet_action_common+0x223/0x820\n   handle_softirqs+0x1ab/0x640\n   \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n\nFix this by storing the request itself in req-\u003ebase.data instead of\n\u0026req-\u003echain, so that acomp_reqchain_done() receives the correct pointer.\nSimplify acomp_restore_req() accordingly to access req-\u003echain directly."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-46081",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-27T14:48:03.013",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-05-27T14:17:29.510",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a2785e5985627f2265ba7775949601a29ba0d1e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/343a5bf68a8ff9affcf2b70677ea4cf40c195ee4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7e20b9bd6c990773cf0c09e2642250b8a70263d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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