FKIE_CVE-2026-46066

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-27 14:17 - Updated: 2026-05-27 14:48
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix num_ops off-by-one when crypto allocation fails move_dirty_folio_in_page_array() may fail if the file is encrypted, the dirty folio is not the first in the batch, and it fails to allocate a bounce buffer to hold the ciphertext. When that happens, ceph_process_folio_batch() simply redirties the folio and flushes the current batch -- it can retry that folio in a future batch. However, if this failed folio is not contiguous with the last folio that did make it into the batch, then ceph_process_folio_batch() has already incremented `ceph_wbc->num_ops`; because it doesn't follow through and add the discontiguous folio to the array, ceph_submit_write() -- which expects that `ceph_wbc->num_ops` accurately reflects the number of contiguous ranges (and therefore the required number of "write extent" ops) in the writeback -- will panic the kernel: BUG_ON(ceph_wbc->op_idx + 1 != req->r_num_ops); This issue can be reproduced on affected kernels by writing to fscrypt-enabled CephFS file(s) with a 4KiB-written/4KiB-skipped/repeat pattern (total filesize should not matter) and gradually increasing the system's memory pressure until a bounce buffer allocation fails. Fix this crash by decrementing `ceph_wbc->num_ops` back to the correct value when move_dirty_folio_in_page_array() fails, but the folio already started counting a new (i.e. still-empty) extent. The defect corrected by this patch has existed since 2022 (see first `Fixes:`), but another bug blocked multi-folio encrypted writeback until recently (see second `Fixes:`). The second commit made it into 6.18.16, 6.19.6, and 7.0-rc1, unmasking the panic in those versions. This patch therefore fixes a regression (panic) introduced by cac190c7674f.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix num_ops off-by-one when crypto allocation fails\n\nmove_dirty_folio_in_page_array() may fail if the file is encrypted, the\ndirty folio is not the first in the batch, and it fails to allocate a\nbounce buffer to hold the ciphertext. When that happens,\nceph_process_folio_batch() simply redirties the folio and flushes the\ncurrent batch -- it can retry that folio in a future batch.\n\nHowever, if this failed folio is not contiguous with the last folio that\ndid make it into the batch, then ceph_process_folio_batch() has already\nincremented `ceph_wbc-\u003enum_ops`; because it doesn\u0027t follow through and\nadd the discontiguous folio to the array, ceph_submit_write() -- which\nexpects that `ceph_wbc-\u003enum_ops` accurately reflects the number of\ncontiguous ranges (and therefore the required number of \"write extent\"\nops) in the writeback -- will panic the kernel:\n\n    BUG_ON(ceph_wbc-\u003eop_idx + 1 != req-\u003er_num_ops);\n\nThis issue can be reproduced on affected kernels by writing to\nfscrypt-enabled CephFS file(s) with a 4KiB-written/4KiB-skipped/repeat\npattern (total filesize should not matter) and gradually increasing the\nsystem\u0027s memory pressure until a bounce buffer allocation fails.\n\nFix this crash by decrementing `ceph_wbc-\u003enum_ops` back to the correct\nvalue when move_dirty_folio_in_page_array() fails, but the folio already\nstarted counting a new (i.e. still-empty) extent.\n\nThe defect corrected by this patch has existed since 2022 (see first\n`Fixes:`), but another bug blocked multi-folio encrypted writeback until\nrecently (see second `Fixes:`). The second commit made it into 6.18.16,\n6.19.6, and 7.0-rc1, unmasking the panic in those versions. This patch\ntherefore fixes a regression (panic) introduced by cac190c7674f."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-46066",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-27T14:48:03.013",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-05-27T14:17:27.320",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6200f41d6fcf2ac7e24866431e381cbc914560e4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0d9555bf9eaeba34fe6b6bb86f442fe08ba3842"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba12c1e578890f6337a415b7dedf476c6d455105"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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