FKIE_CVE-2026-45949

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-27 14:17 - Updated: 2026-05-27 14:48
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition Currently, hwrng_fill is not cleared until the hwrng_fillfn() thread exits. Since hwrng_unregister() reads hwrng_fill outside the rng_mutex lock, a concurrent hwrng_unregister() may call kthread_stop() again on the same task. Additionally, if hwrng_unregister() is called immediately after hwrng_register(), the stopped thread may have never been executed. Thus, hwrng_fill remains dirty even after hwrng_unregister() returns. In this case, subsequent calls to hwrng_register() will fail to start new threads, and hwrng_unregister() will call kthread_stop() on the same freed task. In both cases, a use-after-free occurs: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: ... at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xec/0x1c0 Call Trace: kthread_stop+0x181/0x360 hwrng_unregister+0x288/0x380 virtrng_remove+0xe3/0x200 This patch fixes the race by protecting the global hwrng_fill pointer inside the rng_mutex lock, so that hwrng_fillfn() thread is stopped only once, and calls to kthread_run() and kthread_stop() are serialized with the lock held. To avoid deadlock in hwrng_fillfn() while being stopped with the lock held, we convert current_rng to RCU, so that get_current_rng() can read current_rng without holding the lock. To remove the lock from put_rng(), we also delay the actual cleanup into a work_struct. Since get_current_rng() no longer returns ERR_PTR values, the IS_ERR() checks are removed from its callers. With hwrng_fill protected by the rng_mutex lock, hwrng_fillfn() can no longer clear hwrng_fill itself. Therefore, if hwrng_fillfn() returns directly after current_rng is dropped, kthread_stop() would be called on a freed task_struct later. To fix this, hwrng_fillfn() calls schedule() now to keep the task alive until being stopped. The kthread_stop() call is also moved from hwrng_unregister() to drop_current_rng(), ensuring kthread_stop() is called on all possible paths where current_rng becomes NULL, so that the thread would not wait forever.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad38f2cdfef9a2f2899c30cad269baec5bfd4a5d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc2f39d6ac48e6e3cb2d6240bc0d6df839dd0828
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5b7730f06994499632026c30e38e0317c4569e2
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcf416eb88eafe1e3c0f920a14bdffd10bc4d259
Impacted products
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition\n\nCurrently, hwrng_fill is not cleared until the hwrng_fillfn() thread\nexits. Since hwrng_unregister() reads hwrng_fill outside the rng_mutex\nlock, a concurrent hwrng_unregister() may call kthread_stop() again on\nthe same task.\n\nAdditionally, if hwrng_unregister() is called immediately after\nhwrng_register(), the stopped thread may have never been executed. Thus,\nhwrng_fill remains dirty even after hwrng_unregister() returns. In this\ncase, subsequent calls to hwrng_register() will fail to start new\nthreads, and hwrng_unregister() will call kthread_stop() on the same\nfreed task. In both cases, a use-after-free occurs:\n\nrefcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\nWARNING: ... at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xec/0x1c0\nCall Trace:\n kthread_stop+0x181/0x360\n hwrng_unregister+0x288/0x380\n virtrng_remove+0xe3/0x200\n\nThis patch fixes the race by protecting the global hwrng_fill pointer\ninside the rng_mutex lock, so that hwrng_fillfn() thread is stopped only\nonce, and calls to kthread_run() and kthread_stop() are serialized\nwith the lock held.\n\nTo avoid deadlock in hwrng_fillfn() while being stopped with the lock\nheld, we convert current_rng to RCU, so that get_current_rng() can read\ncurrent_rng without holding the lock. To remove the lock from put_rng(),\nwe also delay the actual cleanup into a work_struct.\n\nSince get_current_rng() no longer returns ERR_PTR values, the IS_ERR()\nchecks are removed from its callers.\n\nWith hwrng_fill protected by the rng_mutex lock, hwrng_fillfn() can no\nlonger clear hwrng_fill itself. Therefore, if hwrng_fillfn() returns\ndirectly after current_rng is dropped, kthread_stop() would be called on\na freed task_struct later. To fix this, hwrng_fillfn() calls schedule()\nnow to keep the task alive until being stopped. The kthread_stop() call\nis also moved from hwrng_unregister() to drop_current_rng(), ensuring\nkthread_stop() is called on all possible paths where current_rng becomes\nNULL, so that the thread would not wait forever."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-45949",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-27T14:48:03.013",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-05-27T14:17:11.327",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad38f2cdfef9a2f2899c30cad269baec5bfd4a5d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc2f39d6ac48e6e3cb2d6240bc0d6df839dd0828"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5b7730f06994499632026c30e38e0317c4569e2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcf416eb88eafe1e3c0f920a14bdffd10bc4d259"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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