FKIE_CVE-2026-45688

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-24 21:16 - Updated: 2026-11-03 23:17
Severity
9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Summary
Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's CAS login handler forwards the client-supplied options.cas.credentialToken value straight into a MongoDB findOne({_id: ...}) query without any runtime type check. TypeScript's string parameter annotation is erased at runtime, so an unauthenticated attacker can substitute a MongoDB query operator ({"$gt": ""}, {"$ne": null}, etc.) for what the server expects to be an opaque ticket string. The injected operator matches the first unexpired document in the credential_tokens collection, bypassing the CAS ticket check entirely. When any legitimate CAS or SAML SSO login is in flight, the attacker's next DDP login call matches the same credential-token row via the NoSQL operator and is issued a full Meteor auth token (userId + token) bound to the victim. The token is immediately usable against the complete REST and DDP surface as that user. If the victim is an administrator, this escalates to full instance compromise via Apps-Engine app install. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
References
security-advisories@github.comhttps://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat/security/advisories/GHSA-rr54-jf4h-6cj9
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "Rocket.Chat",
          "vendor": "RocketChat",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.5.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.5.0"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.4.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.4.1"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.3.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.3.3"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.2.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.2.3"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.1.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.1.4"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 8.0.0-rc.0, \u003c 8.0.5"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 7.11.0-rc.0, \u003c 7.13.7"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 7.10.11"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat\u0027s CAS login handler forwards the client-supplied options.cas.credentialToken value straight into a MongoDB findOne({_id: ...}) query without any runtime type check. TypeScript\u0027s string parameter annotation is erased at runtime, so an unauthenticated attacker can substitute a MongoDB query operator ({\"$gt\": \"\"}, {\"$ne\": null}, etc.) for what the server expects to be an opaque ticket string. The injected operator matches the first unexpired document in the credential_tokens collection, bypassing the CAS ticket check entirely. When any legitimate CAS or SAML SSO login is in flight, the attacker\u0027s next DDP login call matches the same credential-token row via the NoSQL operator and is issued a full Meteor auth token (userId + token) bound to the victim. The token is immediately usable against the complete REST and DDP surface as that user. If the victim is an administrator, this escalates to full instance compromise via Apps-Engine app install. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Rocket.Chat es una plataforma de comunicaciones de c\u00f3digo abierto, segura y totalmente personalizable. Antes de 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7 y 7.10.11, el gestor de inicio de sesi\u00f3n CAS de Rocket.Chat reenv\u00eda el valor options.cas.credentialToken proporcionado por el cliente directamente a una consulta MongoDB findOne({_id: ...}) sin ninguna verificaci\u00f3n de tipo en tiempo de ejecuci\u00f3n. La anotaci\u00f3n de par\u00e1metro de cadena de TypeScript se borra en tiempo de ejecuci\u00f3n, por lo que un atacante no autenticado puede sustituir un operador de consulta de MongoDB ({\u201c$gt\u201d: \u201c\u201d}, {\u201c$ne\u201d: null}, etc.) por lo que el servidor espera que sea una cadena de ticket opaca. El operador inyectado coincide con el primer documento no caducado en la colecci\u00f3n credential_tokens, eludiendo por completo la verificaci\u00f3n del ticket CAS. Cuando cualquier inicio de sesi\u00f3n leg\u00edtimo de CAS o SAML SSO est\u00e1 en curso, la siguiente llamada de inicio de sesi\u00f3n DDP del atacante coincide con la misma fila de token de credencial a trav\u00e9s del operador NoSQL y se le emite un token de autenticaci\u00f3n completo de Meteor (userId + token) vinculado a la v\u00edctima. El token es inmediatamente utilizable contra toda la superficie REST y DDP como ese usuario. Si la v\u00edctima es un administrador, esto escala a un compromiso completo de la instancia a trav\u00e9s de la instalaci\u00f3n de una aplicaci\u00f3n de Apps-Engine. Esta vulnerabilidad se corrige en 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7 y 7.10.11."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-45688",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-03T23:17:44.677",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 9.1,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-45688",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-06-26T03:55:38.005115Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-06-24T21:16:53.847",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat/security/advisories/GHSA-rr54-jf4h-6cj9"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-943"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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